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“To see the Earth as we now see it, small and blue and beautiful in that eternal silence 
where it floats, is to see ourselves as riders on the Earth together, brothers on that bright 
loveliness in the unending night -- brothers who see now they are truly brothers.” 
 
- Archibald Macleish 
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Abstract 
 
Climate change is an issue that presents many threats that are dispersed according to 
geography and vulnerability. Climate change exists within separate discourses and is 
framed uniquely in each discourse. The question that I want to answer with this study is 
why attempted securitizations of climate change have not translated into a widespread 
understanding and acceptance of climate threats. By understanding how climate change 
is constructed as a threat to the public, we can better understand how it is perceived. 
Knowing how climate change is perceived can explain the potential for legitimacy of 
actors and actions. This thesis uses a content analysis of elite discourses to determine 
the prevalence of different threats within climate change communication. This study 
finds that most climate communication makes use of threats that are abstract and 
distant, diminishing the desired effect. Those communicating climate change threats 
make use of visuals to take advantage of the affectual power of images. Previous 
securitizations of climate change have made us of referent objects that are too abstract 
for the audience to be successful. This study argues that to communicate climate change 
threats in a way to increase the salience of the threat, messages must be localized and 
personalized and take advantage of the immediate affectual properties of images. 
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Introduction 
 The implications of anthropogenic climate change for humanity and its 
institutions, the biosphere, and the future are vast and growing along with humanity’s 
understanding of climate change. Since the fact that Earth’s climate is changing became 
widely known, the threats and changes that different actors have emphasized have 
changed along with public discourses. The issue has changed from being a danger to the 
environment and development to, as some have argued, a danger to international 
security and a threat to the existence of humanity.1  
When something is framed as a threat to security, survival, or existence, it 
changes the discourse. This change can legitimize new actors and/or actions. This 
change in the discourse can also paint other actors or actions as inadequate in dealing 
with an urgent and immense threat. As the threats of climate change have changed, our 
perception of the process of global environmental change has shifted. Some have 
argued that the implications of global climate change are so drastic that it justifies a new 
geologic epoch, the Anthropocene.2 No matter how dramatic climate change discourses 
become, they must exist alongside other discourses that compete for the public’s 
attention. These competing discourses may be more tangible or ‘scarier’ like 
                                                 
1 The 1992 Rio Earth Summit’s Declaration on Environment and Development used the language of 
sustainable development to describe climate change. Climate change has been described as a threat to 
national and international security by many within established security circles. Two of the most 
prominent examples are the CAN Corporations’s 2007 report National Security and the Threat of Climate 
Change, and the Department of Defense’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. See Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, adopted June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc. AICONF.1515/Rev. 1 (1992).; 
National Security and the Threats of Climate Change, Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2007.; U.S. Department of 
Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010.  
2 Paul J. Crutzen, "The “anthropocene”," In Earth system science in the Anthropocene, (Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2006) 13-18. 
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international terrorism, or may have more immediate personal connections like 
economic stagnation or collapse.  
The theory of securitization has been widely applied to western democratic 
contexts, and has been sparsely applied elsewhere. The utility of the theory is not 
entirely understood outside of these contexts.3 These same countries that have most 
often been the subjects of securitization scholars are the same countries that have the 
weakest personal connection to the harms of anthropogenic climate change.4 These 
industrialized ‘western’ democracies offer an opportunity to apply securitization theory 
to climate discourses to attempt to explain the lack of binding international climate 
action.  
With this study, I want to find out why climate communication is not effective 
in communicating the threats of climate change in a way that leads to widespread 
knowledge and acceptance of climate threats. To better understand how climate change 
is communicated, I want to understand how the threats associated with climate change 
are articulated, and what objects those threats are targeting. By understanding how 
climate change is constructed as a threat to the public, we can better understand how it 
is perceived. Knowing how climate change is perceived can explain the potential for 
legitimacy of actors and actions. If the public perceives climate change as distant and 
untouchable, then drastic counter-measures will have a harder time gaining legitimacy. 
                                                 
3 Claire Wilkinson, "The Copenhagen School on tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is securitization theory useable 
outside Europe?," Security Dialogue 38.1 (2007): 5-25. 
4 Bruce Stokes, Richard Wike, and Jill Carle, "Global Concern About Climate Change, Broad Support for 
Limiting Emissions." Pew Research Center. Last modified November 5, 2015. 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/11/05/global-concern-about-climate-change-broad-support-for-limiting-
emissions/. 
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The way the public understands an issue defines the responses to that issue they would 
deem legitimate. Further, this study seeks to understand to what extent these discourses 
of climate threats have been securitized successfully, and how actors might better 
communicate the threats of climate change in a way to inspire action. In other words, I 
want to know what it takes to make the citizens and leaders of the Global North to not 
see climate change as an issue that only exists in Africa or South America, but to see the 
issue as one that will have and is having impacts all over the globe, and respond 
urgently. I want to know what it would take for the urgency of our present situation to 
undo entrenched political beliefs that prevent productive and needed mitigation and 
adaptation measures.  
Specifically, in this study I examine how climate change threats are framed 
within editorials and opinion columns from the New York Times, the Washington Post, 
and the Wall Street Journal from the period 2007 to 2015. In categorizing the 
threatened objects of climate change, I break them down to the environment and 
biodiversity, national and international security, the economy, health, our way of life 
and the future, humanity and human civilization, and other threats. To apply the 
language of securitization, these data make it possible to determine what the most 
common referent object is within climate change coverage. I also analyze political party 
platforms from several liberal democracies to determine how politicians construct 
climate change threats. The timeframe for political party platforms covers the years 
1997 to 2015. This period represents the time when climate change became a coherent 
international issue and a topic of treaties. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 was the first 
binding international climate change treaty and marked the beginning of widespread 
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international climate cooperation. The 2015 Paris agreement marks the latest high-level 
international climate agreement. These events are significant when studying discourses 
as they shift and influence the language used in discourses. By using these two events as 
boundaries for this study of climate change discourse, I am able to get a snapshot of 
contemporary discourse on climate change at the international level. 
Additionally, much communication of climate change happens through images 
and visual representations. The communication of threats through images works 
differently than through text. Visual threat communication is on one hand vaguer, but 
on the other can be much more emotionally stimulating. Through reviewing the 
literature, I aim to determine what images are most commonly associated with climate 
change communications.  
 The most commonly occurring threatened objects in climate communication 
within the chosen sources and timeframe were environmental. Editorials from major 
newspapers also frequently communicated threats with no clear threatened object. The 
images used to communicate climate threats are also for the most part environmental, 
but people make up the second most common category.  From this, we can say that 
climate communication uses framing and imagery that are the least likely to 
communicate threats in a way that leads to action. Securitizations are successful when 
the issue being securitized can be shown to be more important than other issues, and 
given a special prioritized status over other issues.5 For this to happen, the audience 
targeted by the securitization must feel that the outlined threat is an existential one to 
                                                 
5 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 1998), 24.   
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the referent object, an object which they value. With the distant environmental 
representations used in much of climate communication, the intended audience does not 
feel that threat because their connection to the threatened object is not especially strong.  
   
 The public is constantly confronted with new threats that use words and images 
to try to soak up the public’s attention. These threats compete against each other and 
often push each other out of the limelight. In every country included in the data in this 
study, the Islamic State is seen as a greater global threat than climate change.6 
Terrorism was one of the main issues of the 2016 US presidential election, and has been 
a prominent topic in European elections also. The ubiquity of terrorism in public 
discourses does not match the real-world capabilities and danger of the threat.7 The 
prospects of global environmental change could have more drastic and longer lasting 
negative consequences than terrorism, but the issue is drowned out by grisly displays of 
terrorism in the media.  
 If climate activists better understand how threats are framed in the public 
through text and images, they can better understand what works and what does not. The 
nature of climate change itself makes it a difficult problem to communicate. While 
effects of climate change are global, they can also be intensely local. Some countries 
may even see a net benefit, within their own borders at least. There is no clear ‘other’ to 
                                                 
6 Jill Carle, "Climate Change Seen As Top Global Threat." Pew Research Center. Last modified July 14, 
2015. http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/07/14/climate-change-seen-as-top-global-threat/. 
7 John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “The Terrorism Delusion,” International Security 37.1 (2012): 81-
110. 
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rally against and the linkages between source and effect are abstract. All of these 
features work against concerted national and international action. 
 This thesis consists of three main chapters, but first I begin by outlining 
securitization theory and its development. The theory has been applied to climate 
change before, but to my knowledge not in relation to the Copenhagen School’s concept 
of macrosecuritizations. Macrosecuritizations are those securitizations that operate on a 
universal or systemic level above states; the most commonly discussed successful 
macrosecuritization is the Cold War.8 The first chapter analyzes data from print media 
and political party platforms to determine the most common referent objects when 
discussing climate change. Next, I review the literature on visual representations of 
climate change. This literature is interdisciplinary and offers insights into the difficulty 
of visual communication of threats. In the last chapter, I determine to what extent 
different climate security discourses have been securitized and end by offering guidance 
on better communicating the threats of climate change.  
 Climate change is the most immense and abstract threat humanity has ever 
faced. Much of the language and images used to communicate these threats reflects the 
immensity, and at times the abstractness, of the problem. To inspire action among 
individuals and states, the threats that climate change poses need to be communicated 
precisely. Polar bears may be an easy symbol for climate change, but starving polar 
bears are not guaranteed to capture the attention of farmers in Iowa or policymakers in 
Berlin. To do that, the communication of climate threats needs to hit home. Climate 
                                                 
8 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, "Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale in 
securitisation theory," Review of international studies 35.2 (2009): 253-276. 
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change competes with other threatening subjects within public discourses, and it often 
fails in maintaining attention. To maintain that attention and to drive action, climate 
threats and implications need to be tailored and precise.  
Theoretical Background on Securitization 
 The concept of securitization was born out of developments in the field of 
security studies that occurred in the final years of the Cold War. After the end of the 
Cold War, states began to broaden their security agendas into new domains. 
Securitization was developed, in part, to explain these expanding agendas.9 
Securitization is defined as the process by which issues are framed as matters of 
security through an intersubjective dialogue between actor and audience. A 
securitization requires that a securitizing actor depict a threat as an existential risk to a 
referent object. This security framing, if accepted, legitimizes the use of measures that 
lay outside the normal bounds of behavior, or break the rules so to speak.10 This process 
is an intersubjective one that happens between the securitizing actor and the audience of 
the securitizing move. Referent objects of securitization have traditionally been states, 
but the theory does not limit the possibilities.  
Some activists attempt to securitize anthropogenic climate change by framing 
climate change as a threat to humankind or human civilization as we know it. By 
framing climate change as a threat on such a massive scale, these activists are 
attempting to create an urgent and extraordinary response. This thinking seems to go 
                                                 
9 Jef Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the creative development of a security studies agenda in 
Europe," European Journal of International Relations 4.4 (1998): 483. 
10 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: 
Lynne Reinner, 1998): 21-26.  
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against the literature on securitization which suggests it would be more actionable to 
frame climate change as a threat to the United Kingdom, or the United States, or more 
generally to the current political system. In the literature of the Copenhagen School, a 
securitization of this magnitude would be characterized as a macrosecuritization, or a 
securitization that works at the global level to order and control all securitizations below 
it. The development of the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization has expanded 
upon its original focus on dominant actors using speech as a method of securitization to 
consider the role of less-than dominant actors and visual securitizations.11  
Securitization 
 Securitization is a theoretical development that came out of a turning point in 
security studies. The drawdown of the Cold War saw many academics looking to 
redefine a field which had until then been dominated by realist approaches, nuclear 
strategy, and Soviet studies.12 Huysmans condenses this new approach into a question 
of how to move security studies past its narrow focus on relations between states 
without becoming so all-encompassing as to become useless.13 Not all security studies 
scholars were in favor of this widening of the field. Stephen Walt cautioned against 
widening the focus from military issues in order to maintain security studies’ 
“intellectual coherence.”14 The Copenhagen School has been a proponent of this 
                                                 
11 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” 
International Studies Quarterly 47.4 (2003): 511–531. 
12 Stephen Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 35.2 (1991): 
211-239.; Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security 8.1 (1983) 129-153; Jessica 
Tuchman Matthews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs 68.2 (1989) 162-177.   
13 Jef Huysman, “Revisiting Copenhagen: or, on the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda 
in Europe,” European Journal of International Relations 4.4 (1998): 482.  
14 Stephen M. Walt, “The Rennaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 35.2 
(1991): 212-213. 
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widening, while also cautioning against an overreaction. The theory takes a European 
perspective, reflects European security experiences, and uses a specific, “European 
historical-cultural understanding of the nation.”15 This perspective has limited 
securitization’s usefulness, as it is rarely applicable outside a Western democratic 
context. While this is a valid critique of the theory as a whole, securitization is being 
applied in this study to ‘western’ industrialized democracies only. 
 The theory of securitization has developed over time, but the basic structure has 
remained unchanged. The core of the theory is the intersubjective meaning of security, 
meaning that there are no objective security threats, only socially constructed threats. It 
is not that these security threats do not pose a legitimate threat, but that all security 
threats are seen as such due to the discourse surrounding them. Securitization theory 
holds that security threats are socially constructed through a securitizing move, usually 
a speech act by a dominant actor, typically a head of state. The securitizing actor 
presents a referent object, an object that is existentially threatened, to an audience and 
calls for extraordinary, ‘rule-breaking’ action to protect the referent object. Whether the 
audience deems the securitizing actor a legitimate voice on the matter and accepts the 
securitization is the measure by which a securitization is evaluated.  This process exists 
on a sliding scale for issues that ranges from non-politicized, to politicized, to 
securitized.16 
                                                 
15 Jef Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen: or, on the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda 
in Europe,” European Journal of International Relations 4.4 (1998): 484. 
16 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: 
Lynne Reinner, 1998): 25.  
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This narrow focus on speech acts and dominant political actors has been one of 
the most prominent criticisms of securitization, although subsequent securitization 
scholars have expanded these criteria to embrace visual or mixed securitization 
techniques, and non-heads of state as securitizing actors.17 Critics argue that in a world 
in which, “communication is increasingly conveyed through electronic media, and in 
which televisual images play an increasingly significant role” securitization theory is 
limiting itself in focusing on speech acts only.18 More recent studies have attempted to 
expand securitization’s framework, by examining not only visual securitizations, but 
also securitizations by non-political actors, such as Vuori’s work on the Bulletin of 
Atomic Scientists’ Doomsday clock.19  
Macrosecuritizations 
Buzan and Waever define a macrosecuritization as a securitization, “on a larger 
scale than the mainstream collectivities at the middle level (states, nations) and seek to 
package together securitisations from that level into a ‘higher’ and larger order."20 
Macrosecuritizations function as a coordinating mechanism for lower level 
securitizations. They go on to describe macrosecuritizations as rarer than middle level 
securitizations, due to the constant need to connect them to smaller, more local 
securitizations. Middle level securitizations have been the traditional referent objects in 
securitizations because they are often what Buzan et al., call “limited collectivities” 
                                                 
17 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” 
International Studies Quarterly 47.4 (2003): 511–531. 
18 Ibid., 525. 
19 Juha A. Vuori, “A Timely Prophet? The Doomsday Clock as a Visualization of Securitization Moves 
with a Global Referent Object,” Security Dialogue 41.3 (2010): 255-277. 
20 Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver, “Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale 
in Securitisation Theory,” Review of International Studies 35 (2009): 257.  
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which establish a ‘we’ identity. Therefore, if there is a ‘we’ identity, there must be a 
‘them’. This dynamic creates a rivalry which facilitates middle level securitizations.21 
System level securitizations are more difficult to implement because their salience is not 
as strong as smaller level securitizations. There is a certain distance between the 
audience and the referent object that makes it more difficult to draw upon the emotions 
of the audience. A systemic level securitization must be able to create a collective 
identity on a larger scale, but these identities are often too subtle to be useful in 
securitization.22 The Copenhagen School also states that a macrosecuritization is not 
required to outrank other securitizations. There is a possibility that a 
macrosecuritization can merely bundle other securitizations together.23 Buzan and 
Waever point to the Global War on Terror as a macrosecuritization that bundles other 
securitizations (drugs, crime, arms trafficking) without outranking them.24 
The Copenhagen School has cited multiple attempts at failed 
macrosecuritizations and relatively few successful ones. Their most prevalent and 
concrete example of a successful macrosecuritization is the Cold War. Buzan et al., 
present the Cold War as a macrosecuritization of nuclear annihilation as a threat to all 
of humanity.25 The Cold War has also been presented as a macrosecuritization on the 
level of a civilization struggle for survival.26 The Cold War ordered and controlled 
                                                 
21 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: 
Lynne Reinner, 1998): 37.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver, “Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale 
in Securitisation Theory,” Review of International Studies 35 (2009): 257.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 36.  
26 Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver, “Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale 
in Securitisation Theory,” Review of International Studies 35 (2009): 256. 
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many lower level securitizations. In creating the concept of macrosecuritization, the 
Copenhagen School underscores the difficulty of achieving a system-level 
securitization. This difficulty is attributed to a lack of established security legitimacy of 
high-level referent objects.27 The lack of an Us vs. Them rivalry also undercuts security 
legitimacy for macrosecuritizations. The more abstract referent objects of 
macrosecuritizations do not have the same level of concreteness and identity compared 
to middle-level securitizations.  
Securitizations are also dependent on the context into which they are introduced. 
The Copenhagen School notes the importance of what they call, ‘facilitating conditions’ 
in the success of securitizations. They break down these conditions into 
internal/linguistic factors and external/contextual factors. The internal factors deal with 
the rules or grammar of security. The closer an actor adheres to the rules of security, the 
more likely the securitization. The external factors include the authority of the 
securitizing actor, which is not limited to official authority, and the features of the 
threat, “that are generally held to be threatening – be they tanks, hostile sentiments, or 
polluted waters.”28 These images draw upon specific societal memories to communicate 
their threats.  
As long as there have been attempts to securitize climate change, there have 
been voices opposing these attempts. The main reason for this opposition has been, 
firstly whether climate change genuinely represents a security threat, and secondly 
whether applying the word security to climate change makes security so broad as to 
                                                 
27 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: 
Lynne Reinner, 1998): 36. 
28 Ibid., 33.  
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become meaningless. Both of these concerns were expressed by Daniel Deudney in 
1990, at the beginning of the climate securitization trend when he said, “If everything 
that causes a decline in human well-being is labelled a ‘security’ threat, the term loses 
any analytical usefulness, and becomes a loose synonym for ‘bad’.”29 Deudney is 
echoing Walt’s earlier remarks about security studies possibly losing its cohesion. 
Deudney was recognizing the beginning efforts of a broader securitization move to 
make environmental causes as urgent as national security through rhetoric. Deudney 
argues that responding to non-military issues with a military solution is the wrong way 
to address them, and slapping a national security label on these issues will make that 
happen. But nothing in securitization requires a military response to a securitized issue. 
Securitization’s extraordinary measures are necessarily a security response. In other 
words, the security label does not require a traditional security response. Deudney’s 
worries that securitizing the environment would lead to competition is dependent on 
creating a foreign ‘other’ to compete with, and responding to a newly securitized 
environment with a security-oriented policy. Neither of these things are unavoidable in 
securitizing the environment.  
It is important to make clear the Copenhagen School’s stance on the usefulness 
of securitization. Buzan and Waever have explicitly pointed out that securitization 
should be viewed as a negative concept. The process of securitization moves an issue 
from being political, or a matter for debate, to an issue that defies normal politics. 
Securitization scholars generally see the process of moving an issue out of the realm of 
                                                 
29 Daniel Deudney, “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” 
Millennium Journal of International Studies 19 (1990): 463-464.  
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political debate and into the realm of non-debate and extraordinary politics as an 
inherently negative and undemocratic process.30  
Norm Entrepreneurship 
 Securitizations are a kind of norm entrepreneurship wherein the securitizing 
actor or norm entrepreneur promotes the change or creation of a norm. Securitizing 
actors are norm entrepreneurs trying to convince their audience of the appropriateness 
of their norm, and in order to be successful, that audience must accept the norm or 
securitization.31 Norms are standards of behavior for actors with a certain identity. 
Securitizations are different only in that they are standards of belief, which in turn 
legitimize behaviors.   
Securitizations gain legitimacy from organizational platforms in much the same 
way that norms do. Attaching a securitizing move or a norm to an organization with 
legitimacy increases the legitimacy of the securitization or norm by proximity. This 
relationship is similar to the Copenhagen School’s facilitating conditions. Finnemore 
and Sikkink argue that creating and changing norms is a form of “strategic social 
construction” whereby actors build upon intersubjective knowledge to deliberately alter 
that common knowledge for a purpose.32 Developments in scholarship on norms points 
to the possibility that macrosecuritizations might be more successful than the 
Copenhagen School predicts. Panke and Petersohn argue that the more precise a norm 
                                                 
30 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: 
Lynne Reinner, 1998): 29.  
31 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization 52.4 (1998): 887-917. 
32 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization 52.4 (1998): 910.  
15 
 
is, the more likely it is to deteriorate rapidly. Broader norms allow for more ‘wiggle 
room’, making it more difficult to detect non-compliance.33 A macrosecuritization that 
says climate change is a threat to humanity, and we should employ extraordinary means 
to counteract it, is broad. It is broad in its referent object, humanity, and broad in its 
outcome because it does not argue a single specific policy response. This 
macrosecuritization is also broad in its scope, as a human referent object makes the 
norm applicable worldwide.  
Macrosecuritizations with Humankind as Referent Object 
Buzan and Waever cite historical examples of successful macrosecuritizations, 
such as the Cold War and the Crusades. These macrosecuritizations were systemic level 
securitizations that held sway over the lower security structure. For a 
macrosecuritization to be successful, according to the literature, it must maintain, 
“permanent sensitivity to the fact that the local securitisations contained within it have 
the option to defect if contradictions seem to undermine their linkage to the higher 
level.”34 If climate activists are framing climate change as an existential threat to 
humanity itself, then securitization theory suggests that this is not likely to be 
successful. The salience and identity relevance of a macrosecuritization is difficult to 
materialize, and as the Copenhagen School suggests, issues of this magnitude are 
unlikely to spur action.  
                                                 
33 Diana Panke and Ulrich Petersohn, "Why international norms disappear sometimes," European Journal 
of International Relations 18.4 (2012): 724-725. 
34 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, “Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in 
Securitisation Theory,” Review of International Studies 35 (2009): 258. 
16 
 
 
Chapter 1: Content Analysis of Scientific, Political, and Editorial Climate Texts 
Some climate change activists have described the changes posed by 
anthropogenic climate change as an existential threat to humanity. Among the most 
well-known statements echoing this is President Obama’s 2016 remark that “climate 
change is a potential existential threat to the entire world if we don’t do something 
about it.”35 This chapter asks how often climate activists use this framing when 
discussing climate change within elite discourses. Available data from 2007 to 2015 do 
not support the hypothesis that the most common way of framing climate change as a 
threat was to the existence of humanity or human civilization. This macro-level 
securitization was among the least common ways of framing a climate change threat 
among the collected data. While there have been some prominent cases of individuals 
using this kind of framing, it is by no means the most common framing of climate 
change. Comparing data from all three chosen newspapers together shows that the most 
common referent object is the environment or biodiversity. However, I make the case 
that environmental referent objects, and threats with undefined referent objects, meet 
the criteria for a macrosecuritization. This makes macrosecuritizations extremely 
common, and the dominant framing, with these discourses. This chapter begins with a 
discussion of the methodology and difficulties in data collection, then moves to findings 
                                                 
35 Keith Johnson, “Obama Says Climate Change is a Security Risk. Why are Republicans Laughing?,” 
Foreign Policy March 21, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/21/obama-says-climate-change-is-a-
security-risk-why-are-republicans-laughing/.  
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from the three source types. Then I discuss the findings in a wider theoretical context. 
Finally, I explore areas of possible further research.  
Measuring Climate Change Discourse 
 Using Ronald Krebs’s study of the dominant narratives of the Cold War as a 
guide, I collected editorials, opinion pieces by editorial board members, and articles by 
opinion columnists (hereafter editorials) from the New York Times, the Washington 
Post, and the Wall Street Journal that mentioned climate change, global warming, or 
greenhouse gases from the period of 2007 to 2015.36 This timeframe is delineated by the 
IPCC’s 2007 fourth assessment report on one end, and the 2015 COP21 in Paris. IPCC 
reports and COP meetings are the most prominent high-level events that occur within 
international climate diplomacy, and these events shape coverage of climate change 
itself. These data include every editorial available from the three chosen publications, 
which is a targeted sampling to cover an ideological spectrum of newspapers with wide 
international recognition. Krebs’s method is useful in identifying dominant narratives in 
public discourse. And as Krebs notes, dominant narratives define the borders of 
legitimate politics.37 An acceptance of an idea within elite discourses translates to 
legitimacy in implementation. Instead of using Krebs’s questionnaire, this study used 
simple category variables to code the way climate change was framed as a threat.  These 
categories were based on the language used to describe what is being threatened by 
climate change within the editorial.  
                                                 
36 Ronald R. Krebs, “How Dominant Narratives Rise and Fall: Military Conflict, Politics, and the Cold 
War Consensus,” International Organization 69.4 (2015): 809–45. 
37 Ibid., 814.  
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 Expanding on Krebs’s framework, I included political party platforms from the 
major political parties in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, New 
Zealand, and Australia in every major national election year since 1997. Political actors 
are the traditional dominant actors in securitization theory and possess the most 
legitimacy. They were included to reflect this fact. The top three parties by the 
percentage of total votes were chosen to represent diversity of views within a country. 
The countries were chosen based on my own language abilities and the fact that the 
securitization framework is best suited to industrialized western democracies.  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) summary for 
policymakers from 2001, 2007, and 2014, which are included with each larger report, 
were also examined. These summary reports are much shorter than the entire report, 
between 20 and 40 pages, and are intended to distill the immense scientific information 
of the full report into a manageable summary for the general public and policy makers. 
The summary reports were examined precisely because these two groups are the 
common audiences of securitizations. The specific focus and contents of each summary 
report changes from year to year.  
 Besides the source specific information, data was collected on whether climate 
change was framed as a threat, and further categorized using the category variables: an 
unspecified or generalized threat, a threat to the environment or biodiversity, a threat to 
peace or security nationally or internationally, a threat to the economy, a threat to the 
future, a threat to health or ‘our way of life, which ranged from the spread of specific 
diseases to more abstract threats, threats to humankind or human civilization, and 
finally an ‘Other’ category, which mostly includes the unique threat posed to low-lying 
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island states. These categories were chosen inductively and are deliberately somewhat 
broad. The number of changes resulting from climate change that could be depicted as 
threats is vast and globally distributed. Choosing categories that are overly specific 
would make the study unwieldy. To code the data, the language that counted as 
describing a threat was fairly restricted. Many editorials call climate change a 
‘challenge’, or an ‘obstacle.’ I did not code these cases as using a threat framing 
because communicating threats, especially a securitizing move, is meant to be explicit. 
Innocuous words that indicate that climate change is a difficult subject do not translate 
the same urgency or danger that explicit threat language does.  
Differing Interpretations 
 The methodologies employed in this study lead to a necessarily subjective 
interpretation of texts, and a small change in interpretation translates to a significant 
change in findings. Throughout the data, many actors framed climate change as a threat 
to the planet. The exact meaning of what this means, that anthropogenic climate change 
threatens planet Earth, is not completely clear. No scientific studies have found 
evidence that climate change could stop the rotation of the Earth or implode the planet 
itself. This leaves two options for interpretation that have different consequences for 
this study. First, threats to the planet could be interpreted as threats with an unspecified 
or generalized referent object. This interpretation basically equates threats to the planet 
with threats on the planet, as in ‘climate change is the greatest threat on Earth’. Second, 
threats to the planet could be interpreted as threats to all things on the planet, which 
would characterize climate change as a threat to humanity and human civilization.  
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 When the data are coded to interpret threats to the planet as threats to humanity, 
the number of macrosecuritizations increase in some sources, and is unchanged in 
others. I made the decision to use this interpretation because I believe it is the intended 
meaning of the authors. However, I do admit that there is a degree of subjectivity to this 
decision.  
 The criteria for macrosecuritizations could be restricted for explicit threats to the 
survival of humanity, but this does not reflect the symbolic or implied meaning of much 
of the language that securitizing actors use. Threats to the environment and unspecified 
threats can be seen as macrosecuritizations due to their symbolic purpose, and their 
inherent vagueness, respectively. Many of the environmental referent objects are meant 
to have a wider, symbolic value. This broader value can be seen as a 
macrosecuritization in that it is meant to connect a global movement to protect the 
environment and counteract the effects of climate change. This is apparent in the choice 
of the polar bear as the symbol of environmental groups. In much of the climate 
communication that makes use of polar bear imagery, the focus is not so much on polar 
bears, as it is on a global environmental movement with polar bears as the face. In this 
way, polar bears have opened “a window on a global crisis.”  Outside of threats to 
specific species, threats to the ‘environment’ are general enough that the label 
macrosecuritization can be applied. It follows that anything that threatens the 
environment writ large also threatens humanity, considering that humanity is both part 
of and wholly dependent on the environment.  
Admittedly, there are caveats to this interpretation. Sometimes an environmental 
group really does just care about the polar bear, or a certain species of South American 
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tree frog. However, these groups are often using the symbolism of a certain species as a 
flag to rally around in the struggle against global environmental change. This 
interpretation does risk mislabeling instances, but I believe it provides a useful 
analytical viewpoint.  
 Unspecified climate threats also fit neatly into the category of 
macrosecuritizations because of their inherent vagueness. This vagueness can make 
these instances a universal threat. The author or speaker does not single out a referent 
object, leaving the position open for any and all referent objects. Of course there are 
possible caveats to this as well. There may be instances where some contextual 
knowledge might make the referent object clear, but the text itself does not do so. As 
they stand, vague threats emanating from climate change signify macrosecuritizations in 
that an unknown threat could be a threat to everything.  
Scientific Community 
 The scientific community was the most conservative in their prescriptions of the 
threat posed by climate change. However, the number of threats mentioned within the 
IPCC report summaries do increase from 2001 to 2014. The 2001 and 2014 report 
summaries use language framing climate change as a threat to the environment or 
biodiversity. This language was often strong, with predictions ranging from, 
“substantial damage to or complete loss of some unique systems and extinction of some 
endangered species,” to “a large fraction of species face increased extinction risk due to 
climate change.”38 The IPCC reports in 2001 and 2014 employed the framing of climate 
                                                 
38 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report. Summary for 
Policymakers,” 2001, 12.   
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change as an existential threat to many species and whole ecosystems. Threats to human 
health appear in IPCC reports from 2001 and 2014. These threats are focused, within 
IPCC summary reports, on populations in low-income countries due to the inability to 
adapt to increased health risks. All three reports include a discussion of the predicted 
adverse effects associated with climate change. However, the 2007 report is shorter and 
is limited to a mostly technical discussion.  
 The 2014 IPCC summary report expands upon the previous, more reserved 
threat-framing of the previous reports and includes predicted threats to economies and 
an increased likelihood of violent conflict, translating to a threat to international peace 
and security.39 The report also predicts a wide-reaching general threat that, “warming by 
the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread and 
irreversible impacts globally.”40 The absence of predictions framing climate change as a 
threat to humanity is not entirely surprising considering the extensive review process 
IPCC reports undergo before publication. The line-by-line discussion of scientific 
research tends to lead to conservative conclusions by the IPCC.41 I do not consider 
threats to the environment as macrosecuritizations in the case of IPCC reports, as 
scientific reports are not likely to use animals as a symbolic representation of larger 
issues in the same way that activists would.  
                                                 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary Chapter 
for Policymakers,” 2014, 13.   
39 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary 
Chapter for Policymakers,” 2014, 15-17.  
40 Ibid., 17. 
41 "Principles and Procedures." IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Accessed January 
23, 2017. http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_procedures.shtml. 
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 The scientific literature contributes to the facilitating conditions of securitizing 
climate change, as the science provides a basis for which to make predictions for 
securitizing actors. Scientific data from the IPCC provide the external context that 
increases the chance of success for securitizing actors. The context provides cultural 
meaning, which along with textual meaning, create the semantic repertoire of security.42 
Political Party Platforms 
 Political party platforms offered the widest range of threat-framings within the 
data. Climate change as a threat to humanity was among the least common ways of 
framing climate change within party platforms, occurring only 9 times in the 62 party 
platforms mentioning climate change, but this framing was more common than within 
all other sources. This way of threat-framing was mostly used by left-leaning political 
parties, with the exception of Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The US 
Democratic Party was the first party to use the threat-to-humanity framing, saying in its 
2008 party platform that, “our response [to climate change] will determine the very 
future of life on this earth."43 The Democrats’ 2016 platform warns of leaving “a planet 
that has been profoundly damaged,” and in the 2008 party platform planned to defeat 
“the epochal, man-made threat to the planet: climate change.”44 This language is not 
contained to the US. In 2004 the Australian Labor Party said saving the planet is “the 
                                                 
42 Thierry Balzacq, “A Theory of Securitization,” In Securitization Theory: How Security Problems 
Emerge and Dissolve, edited by Thierry Balzacq, 1–30. New York: Routledge, 2011, 13-15. 
43 Democratic National Committee, “Democratic Party Platform,” 2008. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=78283. 
44 Democratic National Committee, “2016 Democratic Party Platform,” 2016, 27. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/117717.pdf.  
Democratic National Committee, “Democratic Party Platform,” 2008. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=78283.  
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greatest intergenerational challenge of them all.”45 But this instance lacks explicit threat 
language. The Labour Party of New Zealand used similar language in 2014 when it 
framed climate change as, “a severe threat to the planet and to the future of humans and 
other species.”46 The only conservative party to use this framing in the data was 
Germany’s CDU in 2009 when it called climate change a danger to creation.47 This use 
of slightly stilted and biblical wording perhaps reflects the party’s Catholic base, and 
therefore Catholicism’s concept of environmental stewardship.  
The Australian Greens used different wording in 2013 but with similar 
connotations when they called climate change a threat to our society.48 Germany’s The 
Left characterized climate change as aggravating the daily struggle for survival of 
millions of people in its 2009 party platform, and while this does not come off as a 
threat against all of humanity, it is a threat against a large portion of humanity.  
 Climate change as a threat to the environment or biodiversity or a vague 
generalized threat were the most common framings in political platforms. Each of these 
framings were used 16 times within the 62 platforms mentioning climate change. 
Including all threat-to-humanity instances, macrosecuritizations occurred 41 times 
                                                 
45 Andrea Volkens, Pola Lehmann, Theres Matthieß, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel: The Manifesto Data 
Collection. Manifesto Project. Version 2016b. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 
(2016). 
46 New Zealand Labour Party, “Policy Platform,” 2013, 6. 
https://www.labourparty.org.nz/sites/default/files/NewZealandLabourPartyPolicyPlatform.pdf.   
47 I’m grateful to my colleague Stefanie Neumeier for clarification on the connotation of this phrase in 
German. Christlich Demokratische Union. “Wir Haben Die Kraft: Gemeinsam Fuer Unser Land. 
Regierungsprogramm 2009-2013,” 2009, 70.  
http://www.kas.de/upload/ACDP/CDU/Programme_Bundestag/2009-2013_Regierungsprogramm_Wir-
haben-die-Kraft_Gemeinsam-fuer-unser-Land.pdf. 
48 The Australian Greens. “Standing Up for What Matters: The Greens’ Plan for a Better Australia,” 
2013, 20.  https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/down/originals/63110_2013.pdf.   
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within 62 political platforms. Macrosecuritizations are common within political party 
platforms. The reason for this is explained below.  Predicted environmental threats from 
climate change are set within a national context in party platforms, most clearly 
illustrated by Australian Parties’ focus on the threat posed by climate change to the 
Great Barrier Reef.  
Editorials 
Within the newspaper sources there is a large disparity in language used when 
discussing climate change, and also a large disparity in the attention given to the issue. 
This reflects the ideological spectrum of the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, 
and the New York Times. Threats to humanity and civilization are the third most 
common framing of climate change among editorials. This framing of climate change 
occurred in the New York Times and the Washington Post, but not in the Wall Street 
Journal. As a percentage of the total, this framing was the third most common, with 3 
percent of the total articles. Among these editorials, framing climate change as a threat 
to humanity or human civilization was more common than framing it as a threat to 
health, security, and the economy.   
As with other sources, the most common ways of framing climate change in the 
New York Times was as either an unspecified threat or a threat to the environment or 
biodiversity. But within editorials, threats to humanity occurred eighteen times, which 
accounts for 3 percent of all editorials mentioning climate change. This 3 percent 
contains some rather striking macrosecuritizations. In an editorial in the New York 
Times in October 2007 about Al Gore being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the 
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editorial board echoes the sentiments of the Peace Prize Committee in calling climate 
change a threat to “the security of mankind.”49 Another instance, also in 2007, says that 
humans now have, “the power to destroy…the balance of life on earth.”50  
This set also includes two instances of opinion columnist Paul Krugman framing 
climate change as a threat to our civilization, both in 2015. In an opinion piece about 
terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, Paul Krugman said “when President Obama 
describes climate change as the greatest threat we face, he's exactly right. Terrorism 
can't and won't destroy our civilization, but global warming could and might.”51 
Krugman penned a similar statement in December of 2015 in refence to the Republican 
Party that said “we're looking at a party that has turned its back on science at a time 
when doing so puts the very future of civilization at risk.”52 These two articles represent 
explicit macrosecuritizations on the part of Krugman.  
The Washington Post published far fewer editorials mentioning climate change, 
and only three that framed climate change as a threat to humanity. These editorials used 
less explicit and more euphemistic language when describing climate change as a threat 
to humanity. Editorials in the Washington Post called for climate action to “save the 
planet.”53 The Washington Post also warned of “taking a huge gamble with the world’s 
future” and saving “the earth from terrible injury.”54 The two most common framings in 
                                                 
49 Editorial Board, “A Prize for Mr . Gore and Science,” New York Times, October 10, 2007. 
50 Editorial Board, “Evangelical Environmentalism,” New York Times, March 10, 2007. 
51 Paul Krugman, “Fearing Fear Itself,” New York Times, November 16, 2015.  
52 Paul Krugman, “Climate Denial Denial,” New York Times, December 4, 2015.  
53 Editorial Board, “Climate Change Lessons; It’s not easy going green,” Washington Post, December 14, 
2008.  
54 Eugene Robinson, “Green Grass Roots,” Washington Post, September 23, 2014.; Editorial Board, “The 
World’s Collective Pledge,” Washington Post, December 13, 2015.  
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the Washington Post were unspecified threats, and threats to the environment. Both of 
these framings occurred in percentages only slightly below those of the New York 
Times. Finally, in the Wall Street Journal climate change was only framed as a threat a 
single time, and the framing was as an unspecified threat. The editorial calls climate 
change a “far-off and diffuse threat[s].”55  
Overall, of the 621 editorials mentioning climate change in all three newspapers, 
12.9% explicitly framed climate change as a threat, and 3% framed climate change as a 
threat to humanity or human civilization, as shown in Table 1. By far the two most 
common ways of framing climate change as a threat were to the environment, with 
5.6%, and as an unspecified threat, with 5.2%. Combining these categories increases the 
frequency of macrosecuritizations to 13.8% of all editorials in this dataset.  
With these two categories labelled as macrosecuritizations, as I have argued for, 
the top three most common categories for editorials are macrosecuritizations. Even if 
we reject environmental referent objects and undefined referent objects as 
macrosecuritizations, threats to humanity and human civilization are still the third most 
common referent object in this dataset. 
Analysis 
 In Table 1, we can see that 13.8% of the newspaper editorials about climate 
change from the chosen time period and publications contain macrosecuritizations. As a 
share of the total climate threats, these three categories account for 77%. These broad 
threats are the dominant way of framing climate change in these publications. Political 
                                                 
55 Bret Stephens, “A Denier’s Confession,” Wall Street Journal, August 28, 2007. 
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party platforms also contain a high number of macrosecuritizations. 67% of the party 
platforms mentioning climate change contain macrosecuritizations, and 59% of all 
climate threats within party platforms are directed towards the environment, humanity, 
or are non-specific. Tables 1 and 2 also show that without including environmental 
referent objects and unspecified referent objects, macrosecuritizations are still among 
the most common ways of framing climate change. The question that this leads us to is 
why, during this period, this kind of framing has not been more effective. 
The presence of a threat-to-humanity framing, the narrower interpretation of a 
macrosecuritization, within political party platforms provides interesting insights into 
the goals of political actors. Political actors employing this framing would likely be the 
most legitimate actors to do so. Political actors do not necessarily possess the most 
legitimacy when compared to other actors, but in the case of possible climate 
securitizations the political actors would be among the most legitimate because 
solutions to climate change are policy-oriented. Therefore, any viable climate solution 
would revolve around political actors and rely on their implementation of the solution.  
 As Table 4 illustrates, political party platforms that contained humanity as a 
referent object have twice as many referent objects when compared to platforms that 
exclude humanity as a referent object, but do frame climate change as a threat. These 
political actors, by including several securitizations within party platforms, are 
attempting to construct what the Copenhagen School calls a security constellation. 
Security constellations are a concept that the Copenhagen School uses to show that 
securitizations at separate levels can be connected by social identities and political 
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processes.56 In employing macrosecuritization framing, along with multiple other 
referent objects, these actors are attempting to order lower climate securitizations 
(international security, human security, national security).  
 This is a strategy meant to overcome the difficulty of securitizing abstract 
threats, because the abstract threats “are still too subtle and indirect to trigger the levels 
of mass identity necessary for securitization.”57 This bundling, argue Buzan and 
Waever, creates a security constellation that orders all securitizations below the 
macrosecuritization.58 This is done to tap into identities more closely linked to the 
environment, national security, or the economy, and use this identity connection to 
support the macrosecuritization. This same sort of bundling does not occur in editorials, 
most likely due to the medium. Party platforms can be hundreds of pages, and editorials 
rarely stretch for more than a few pages. This limited space in which to get the point 
across in editorials means that the authors cannot connect separate securitizations easily. 
Of all the editorials examined that contained climate threats, the number of threats in 
each editorial was slightly more than one, on average. This limitation of the medium 
likely explains the lower incidence of macrosecuritizations within newspaper editorials.  
The Absence of an ‘Other’ 
                                                 
56 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. “Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in 
Securitisation Theory Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in 
Securitisation Theory.” Review of International Studies 35.2 (2009): 257.  
57 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 37.  
58 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. “Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in 
Securitisation Theory Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in 
Securitisation Theory,” Review of International Studies 35.2 (2009): 257-258.  
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 Underpinning the difficulty of a successful macrosecuritization is the lack of an 
‘Other’ to securitize against. In climate macrosecuritizations, the threat is defined as 
universal, precluding the existence of a threatening other, or referent subject. The 
universal referent object and the universal referent subject are one and the same. Even 
with the more common smaller-scale referent objects climate change does not represent 
an ‘Other’. While middle level referent objects have the benefit of a closer identity 
relationship than system level referent objects, both levels lack an opaque ‘Other’ under 
anthropogenic climate change.  
 The option for securitizing actors of climate change is to create an ‘Other’. 
Actors could hold up a single actor, or group of actors, as being more responsible for 
the universal threat than others. There has been an attempt to establish fossil fuel 
companies as this other, which has taken the form of a movement to divest from the 
fossil fuel industry.59  
Conclusion 
 Macrosecuritizations, threats to the environment, unspecified threats, and threats 
to humanity, dominate elite discourses on climate change. In the case of political party 
platforms this is true from the period 1997-2015, and for editorials this is true from the 
period 2007-2015. The dominance of these framings has not led to enforceable 
international agreements, and has not led to citizens of these countries personally 
                                                 
59 David Kaiser and Lee Wasserman, “The Rockefeller Family Fund vs. Exxon,” New York Review of 
Books December 8, 2016.; David Kaiser and Lee Wasserman, “The Rockefeller Family Fund Takes on 
ExxonMobil,” New York Review of Books, December 22, 2016.  
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connecting climate change to their own lives. This is due to the psychological distance 
that these framings create, which I will explore deeper in chapters 2 and 3.  
Political actors make the macrosecuritization case along with several lower-level 
securitizations in order to bundle and control them. The humankind macrosecuritization 
is connected, through identity, to the lower level securitizations. The referent objects of 
the lower-level securitizations are much more salient than the referent object of the 
macrosecuritization, humanity. The threats of lower-level securitizations are also more 
salient because in the macrosecuritization the threat is ‘us’.  This effort to create a wide-
ranging security constellation is an attempt to overcome the abstract nature of the 
referent subject. The threats are so varied and far-reaching that the threats overcome the 
abstractness of the referent object.  
Areas of further research would include, firstly, an examination of the previous 
newspapers starting from 1997 to incorporate discourse surrounding the Kyoto 
Protocol. Also interesting, but more daunting, would be to track climate discourse 
starting at the 1972 Stockholm meeting or the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. Including this 
period would possibly have a more common occurrence of macrosecuritizations, 
because climate discourse in the early 2000s was influenced by Al Gore’s stark climate 
warnings. Analyzing editorials from newspapers outside of the US would provide a 
more comprehensive international view of climate change among elites. Analysis of a 
major newspaper from each country examined in the party platforms would offer a 
thorough view of among western states. Securitization theory is not widely applied 
outside of western democratic states, but inclusion of non-western states’, or even a 
greater number of western states’ political rhetoric on climate change would provide a 
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clearer view of climate change framings. The views of small island nations would 
provide a particularly interesting insight because to many of them climate change is 
quite possibly an existential threat. A wider selection of scientific sources, in addition to 
the IPCC’s conservative and immense review process, would most likely provide a 
broader and possibly more threat-laden view of climate change.  
Table 1: 
Referent Object of Climate Change Threat 
Newspaper Editorials 2007-2015 
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Table 2: 
Referent Object of Climate Change Threat 
Political Party Platforms 1997-2016 
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Table 3: 
Number of Referent Objects in Party Platforms 
 Platforms with 
macrosecuritizations 
Platforms without 
macrosecuritizations 
Average number of different 
referent objects 4 1.9 
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Chapter 2: Visual Securitizations in Climate Communication 
Securitization theory is centered on the speech act and the effects it can have on 
an audience, but as Michael Williams argues, in a world as dominated by the image as 
our own a restriction to speech seems incomplete.60 Williams notes the increasing 
importance of visual images not only for political communication, but also 
communicative action in general.61 The security issues of the late 20th Century became 
entangled with, and inseparable from, their visual representations. Because of this, 
Williams calls for a more thorough examination of the image in security studies 
generally, and within securitization theory more specifically.62 Williams returns to 
Buzan and Waever to clarify that securitization is not inherently bound to speech, but 
relies on “a broader performative act which draws upon a variety of contextual, 
institutional, and symbolic resources for its effectiveness.”63 It is these contextual and 
symbolic resources that will be the main points of discussion for this chapter.  
The editorials in chapter 1 represent an elite discourse on climate change, which 
has been established as the delineating line for legitimate politics. But that discourse is 
only part of the picture, so to speak. Visual images dominate modern life and play an 
important part of the dissemination of information. Images have a strong emotional 
power that climate activists are very much aware of and try to use to their advantage. 
Images related to climate change have appeared in political cartoons, used on signs at 
protests, depicted in movies (most notably Al Gore’s An Inconveinient Truth), and are 
                                                 
60 Michael C. Williams, "Words, images, enemies: Securitization and international politics," International 
Studies Quarterly 47.4 (2003): 524.  
61 Ibid., 524. 
62 Ibid., 524-526. 
63 Ibid., 526.  
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shared and circulated across the internet.64 These images are used to illustrate to the 
viewer what climate change will do, and what it is doing to the world we know, and/or 
what should be done about it. Cartoons may depict an exaggerated version of rising sea 
levels to deliver a political message, news coverage and movies may show enormous 
blocks of Arctic ice crashing into the sea, and protestors may hold signs showing human 
hands physically protecting the earth.65 What these images do not do is bring home the 
dangers of climate change. These images present climate change as an abstract issue. 
Without a certain degree of salience, we cannot expect the viewer of these images to be 
moved to action.  
This chapter is structured in two sections. The first section will offer a brief 
survey of how securitization scholars have attempted to integrate the image into their 
work. This literature offers an interesting variety of cases from the Doomsday Clock to 
cartoon depictions of the Prophet Muhammad that have become securitized. The second 
section will cover the common ways of depicting climate change visually through 
different media.   
The Image in Securitization Theory 
Williams is not the first to engage the image in international politics, or security 
for that matter. Recent scholarship on the image in international relations is grounded in 
the work of Roland Bleiker, specifically his 2001 article on ‘the aesthetic turn’ in 
                                                 
64 Patrick Chappatte, "Someday, People may Provide a new Energy Source," Cartoon. New York Times. 
December 4, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/opinion/cartoon-chappatte-on-climate-
change.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fpatrick-chappatte.; Al Gore, An Inconvenient Truth, directed 
by Davis Guggenheim, (2006; Paramount Classics).  
65 "Peoples Climate March Printable Posters," NRDC. March 27, 2017. Accessed April 2017. 
https://www.nrdc.org/peoples-climate-march-printable-posters. 
36 
 
international politics.66 Bleiker introduces aesthetics in international politics as opposed 
to mimetic forms of representation, that attempt to represent “world politics as-it-really-
is.”67 In Bleiker’s conception of aesthetics in international politics, there exists a gap 
between the object being represented and its representation. The essence of Bleiker’s 
argument is that within that gap, the translation between object and representation, is 
where politics resides.68 This is thoughtfully articulated in an article that precedes 
Bleiker’s introduction of the aesthetic turn, Dauber’s examination of the impact of 
televisual images on US involvement in Somalia.69 Dauber restricts her examination to 
photojournalism, including images and videos broadcast on the news and images in 
print media. Dauber makes this decision because the audience does not perceive 
photojournalistic images as representative, but rather mimetic representations, or 
evidence of an event. This perception of photojournalism makes the audience even 
more susceptible to the power of images.70  
Dauber argues, citing press reports, that it was not the casualties inflicted in 
Somalia that led to the withdrawal of American troops, but rather the reaction to images 
of the casualties.71 Besides illustrating poignantly how images affect perceptions and 
reactions in security situations, Dauber stresses the matter of context. In relation to 
images, the context into which they are produced is pre-existing. The context that 
surrounds the image contributes to the ways it is interpreted. In the case that Dauber 
                                                 
66 Roland Bleiker, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” Millennium 30.3 (2001): 509-
533. 
67 Ibid., 510.  
68 Ibid., 510.  
69 Cori Dauber, “Image as Argument: The Impact of Mogadishu on US Military Interventions,” Armed 
Forces and Society 27.2 (2001): 205-229.  
70 Ibid., 207.  
71 Ibid., 215.  
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examines, the surrounding captions, headings, and text shape the way the images of 
captured or killed American soldiers are perceived and understood.72 But Dauber takes 
a narrow view of context. There are two relevant aspects of context within securitization 
theory, which Buzan and Waever call facilitating conditions; these aspects are a 
determining factor in the success of the securitization. The first aspect of context is 
what Buzan and Waever call the “internal, linguistic-grammatical,” which sets the 
structure and rules for the securitization itself.73 This is the context that Dauber refers 
to, the context of the newspaper page itself. Dauber only alludes to the second, larger 
context. This larger context encompasses the audience’s attitudes, and the specific 
temporal-cultural space that the image is produced in. Buzan and Waever deem this 
context the, “external, contextual and social.”74 And while Buzan and Waever connect 
the external context directly to the securitizing actor, it can be realistically applied to a 
general societal predisposition. Dauber considers these factors, but does not directly 
connect them to her other contextual factors. She mentions that the images of captured 
US soldiers in Somalia are reminiscent of US POWs in Vietnam, situating them within 
a societal historical context.75 This societal context is something that both actor and 
audience are aware of and can draw upon when they use images.  
An important factor of context is that it does not lead to a single interpretation. 
Different communities have something like a ‘collective visual memory’ that does not 
lead to a single interpretation, but does limit the amount of possible interpretations 
                                                 
72 Ibid., 210.  
73 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde, Security: a new framework for analysis (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1998), 32.  
74 Ibid., 32. 
75 Cori Dauber, “Image as Argument: The Impact of Mogadishu on US Military Interventions,” Armed 
Forces and Society 27.2 (2001): 213.  
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within a community.76 For example, Dauber’s images of captured or killed American 
soldiers in Somalia play into the ‘collective visual memory’ or societal historical 
context of the Vietnam war, and the possible interpretations are withdrawal or to scale-
up the intervention. Even if the available differing interpretations are at extreme ends, 
they are restricted.77 This collective visual memory represents how images can have 
power in a society over time. In much the same way that images of POWs in Somalia 
are reminiscent of POWS in the Vietnam War, climate activists use depictions of the 
Earth that are reminiscent of images shown around the world in the late 1960s and early 
1970s that showed earth, alone, for the first time. Those images had a certain societal 
weight that current activists draw upon. Collective visual memory influences how an 
audience interprets the images that are presented to it, and this interpretation has 
implications for the success of a securitization.  
Replying to Williams’s call for an exploration of images in securitization, 
several scholars have conducted insightful research into the relationship between the 
two. Lene Hansen provides a useful framework for analyzing images in securitization in 
her work on the Muhammad cartoon crisis. Hansen describes in detail three aspects of 
visual securitizations. The first aspect is immediacy, which draws upon the emotional 
weight that the image holds above textual securitizations and is tied into the larger 
social context. Supporting the immediate emotional power of images is the authenticity 
that accompanies some forms of visual communication, especially photojournalism. 
                                                 
76 Lene Hansen, “Theorizing the image for Security Studies: Visual securitization and the Muhammad 
Cartoon Crisis,” European Journal of International Relations 17.1 (2011): 55.  
77 Cori Dauber, “Image as Argument: The Impact of Mogadishu on US Military Interventions,” Armed 
Forces and Society 27.2 (2001): 218.  
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This immediacy is especially evident when comparing images to text, which takes time 
and attention to communicate its message. This is a point that Dauber makes also.78 The 
second aspect is circulability, based on the ease with which modern media can 
disseminate images. Hansen claims that this ease challenges the traditional political elite 
securitizing actors. And finally, the third aspect is ambiguity, which alludes to the 
imprecise nature of images. Images may be able to efficiently communicate emotions, 
but they cannot communicate specific policies. Also, due to the possibility for multiple 
interpretations, completely different conclusions can be made from the same image. 
Hansen states that whether the ambiguity of images is a benefit or a drawback of a 
securitization cannot be answered through theory, but must be empirically tested.79 
These three attributes of visual communication that Hansen lays out set the stage for the 
examination of further visual securitizations.  
Hansen also constructs a framework for studying images in securitization in 
direct reply to Williams’ request for one. Hansen’s framework consists of four parts, 
“the image(s) themselves, the immediate intertext, the dominant policy discourses in the 
country/locale in question, and the linguistic texts that attribute meaning to the image or 
a group thereof.”80 The image is the necessary starting place, as the content of the image 
is the starting place for the securitization itself. The intertext of the image is equivalent 
to Buzan and Waever’s internal grammar; how the immediate context of the image 
works to create a securitization. The final two parts of the framework seek to explain 
                                                 
78 Ibid., 206.  
79 Lene Hansen, “Theorizing the image for Security Studies: Visual securitization and the Muhammad 
Cartoon Crisis,” European Journal of International Relations 17.1 (2011): 57-58.  
80 Ibid., 55.  
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the external context, or how the image works to affect policy, and how social context 
works to provide a meaning for the image.  
Before moving on to the visual securitization of climate change, it is necessary 
to clearly state what constitutes an image, and whether images can speak for 
themselves. Heck and Schlag’s analysis of a TIME magazine cover, and its 
securitization of the female body in the war in Afghanistan provides several useful 
insights into what constitutes an image, and the ability of the image to ‘speak 
security.’81 Heck and Schlag, paraphrasing Mitchell, claim that studying the visual is 
not limited to media and images, but can extend to mental images. What an image 
depicts is dependent on how an image is perceived. And thus, images “do not exist prior 
to their constitutive relations with producers and spectators.”82 The discussion of 
visualizing climate change below will include some points on how climate change is 
visualized mentally. On the question of whether an image itself can ‘speak security,’ or 
to put it more bluntly, whether an image can contain an inherent argument, there seems 
to be some disagreement between Mitchell, Hansen, and Heck and Schlag. Hansen 
quotes Mitchell as saying “images are not words. It is not clear that they actually ‘say’ 
anything. They may show something, but the verbal message or speech act has to be 
brought to them by the spectator, who projects a voice into the image…”83 Heck and 
Schlag reference this same quotation, but also offer a different perspective. The authors 
cite Bredekamp, who argues that the gap between object and representation give the 
                                                 
81 Axel Heck and Gabi Schlag, “Securitizing Images: The Female Body and the War in Afghanistan,” 
European Journal of International Relations 19.4 (2013): 891-913. 
82 Axel Heck and Gabi Schlag, “Securitizing Images: The Female Body and the War in Afghanistan,” 
European Journal of International Relations 19.4 (2013): 897.  
83 Lene Hansen, “Theorizing the image for Security Studies: Visual securitization and the Muhammad 
Cartoon Crisis,” European Journal of International Relations 17.1 (2011): 54. 
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image its own voice.84 Unfortunately, this debate, and the debate over the exact 
definition of an image, are not settled within the literature. But the discursive nature of 
securitization would seem to necessitate a view that images do not speak for 
themselves. For an image to speak for itself, that voice would have to be uniform. To 
put it differently, for an image to have its own voice it would have to be able to argue 
for a single interpretation, something that Hansen says is impossible. I agree with 
Hansen’s assertion. If an image has two possible interpretations that are directly 
contradictory, then the image is not speaking with a single voice.  
Vuori’s analysis of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ (BAS) Doomsday Clock 
offers a case study that leads into discussions of climate change nicely. Vuori’s work 
uses the Doomsday Clock as a symbol of a macrosecuritization, but in this instance the 
image is used in an attempt to desecuritize nuclear weapons and nuclear war.85 The 
Cold War is one of the few instances that can be categorized as a successful 
macrosecuritization, one that overshadows a national referent object and creates a 
systemic level threat. The scientists in Vuori’s case study are attempting to desecuritize 
nuclear weapons by using an image with emotional power to symbolize mankind’s 
destruction. The use of a clock as the visual symbol, and the internal context of the 
clock counting down lend a feeling of doom that contains an underlying call for rapid 
change to avert disaster.86 This desecuritization attempt led by scientists from BAS also 
offers a case study of how actors outside of the political elite use their social capital to 
                                                 
84 Axel Heck and Gabi Schlag, “Securitizing Images: The Female Body and the War in Afghanistan,” 
European Journal of International Relations 19.4 (2013): 898.  
85 Juha A. Vuori, “A Timely Prophet? The Doomsday Clock as a Visualization of Securitization Moves 
with a Global Referent Object,” Security Dialogue 41.3 (2010): 255-277.  
86 Ibid., 259.  
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make arguments. The legitimacy these scientists hold in the eyes of the public does not 
stem from a political legitimacy, Vuori argues, or even from a competence in nuclear 
weapons policy. It stems from their legitimacy as scientists, which lends itself to other 
fields.87 It is this legitimacy that the scientists utilize to make their desecuritizing claim. 
Vuori summarizes the basis of their appeal:  
Indeed, through the symbol of the Doomsday Clock, the Scientists have been 
able to combine their social capital as voices of reason and objectivity with that 
of the soothsayer to influence society and behaviour. While science deals with 
concepts, the symbol of the Clock relates to emotions; while the Scientists’ 
textual arguments try to awaken the reason of their audience, the symbol of the 
Clock tries to reach its bare sensibilities (cf. Stegeman, 1969).88 
This combination of reason and emotion is a possible strategy for 
securitizing/desecuritizing, and presents a potential pathway for communicating climate 
change for other actors outside of the political elite. The Doomsday Clock serves as a 
fascinating analysis of a macrosecuritization at work, and also the power of a visual 
desecuritization. Also interesting is that the scientists at BAS have been including 
threats from climate change into their Doomsday Clock assessments since around 
2007.89 But ultimately the desecuritization that the scientists pursued was unsuccessful, 
evidenced by the continual existence of nuclear weapons.  
 Before turning to the visual representations of climate change, it is worth 
summing up what has been established about the study of images in securitization. To 
study the image in securitization is to attempt to understand how an image, which is not 
                                                 
87 Ibid., 262.  
88 Juha A. Vuori, “A Timely Prophet? The Doomsday Clock as a Visualization of Securitization Moves 
with a Global Referent Object,” Security Dialogue 41.3 (2010): 263.  
89 “Timeline,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, accessed March 10, 2017, http://thebulletin.org/timeline.  
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necessarily limited to physical images, can create the feeling of identity that is critical 
for a successful securitization. Whether that feeling is created by the image itself, or the 
discourse surrounding the image, is not settled. It is essential to understand the 
immediate, internal context as well as the societal, external context to fully evaluate the 
image and its surrounding discourse. Images are different from spoken or written 
securitizations in that they possess an immediate emotional weight. This rapid affective 
power of images is what sets them apart as tools of communicative action. Where 
images do not differ from words is the way they are spread and shared, and their 
indefinite meaning. Establishing these traits of the image allows for a clearer appraisal 
of the literature on communicating climate change visually, which will be covered in 
the next section. 
Visualizing Climate Change  
The literature on visual securitization of climate change is small, but there is a 
budding subset of Communication Studies that takes an interdisciplinary approach to 
how climate change is communicated, how to do it effectively, and how to study it. The 
literature referenced in this section reflects the interdisciplinary nature of climate 
communication. When considering how climate change is communicated, the image 
seems to be particularly useful. The global nature of anthropogenic climate change 
means that communication must be able to overcome spoken language barriers, and 
embrace the near-universal language of the image. The emotional weight, or in 
Hansen’s terms, the immediacy of the image could be essential to condensing the 
abstract nature of climate change. The media reflected in this literature varies widely, 
ranging from mental images, to newspapers, to visualizations of scientific data, to 
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videos, and to photographs. The following section provides an overview of the literature 
on communicating climate change visually, with attention to common referent objects. 
This overview seeks to provide a visual reply to the previous chapter’s data on common 
referent objects within text.  
The only article to directly address the three themes of securitization, visual 
imagery, and climate change is Rørbæk’s analysis of the film shown at the opening 
ceremony of COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009.90 Rørbæk analyzes the film under the 
assumption that climate change has already been successfully securitized, and attempts 
to determine what this film contributes to the existing securitization.91 The film, shown 
to a crowd of diplomats and climate experts from around the world, depicts a young 
girl, who after dreaming of the horrors of a changing global environment, pleads for 
help from the audience.92 The film, a clear securitization, is also one of the few 
securitizations with a clearly defined and limited audience. While the audience is the 
international group of climate negotiators themselves, Rørbæk argues that the intended 
referent object is universal, or what he calls “one global collective identity.”93 This 
presents difficulties within a traditional securitization framework, and also within a 
Schmittian conception of identities. The difficulty lies within the fact that a universal 
referent object, or ‘Self’, seems to preclude the possibility of a threatening subject, or 
‘Other’.94 Rørbæk paraphrases Schmitt by saying that “this renders the formation of 
                                                 
90 Tore Rørbæk, "Words, visuals, and the vanished enemy: Visual securitization and the COP15 opening 
film," In Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict, ed. Jurgen Scheffran, Michael Brzoska, 
Hans Gunter Brauch, Peter Michael Link, and Janpeter Schilling, (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012), 
273-287. 
91 Ibid., 277.  
92 Ibid., 273.  
93 Ibid., 273.  
94 Ibid., 284.  
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identities unfeasible as it considers the identification of an enemy ‘Other’ as a condition 
for the possibility of a ‘Self’.”95 In the analysis of the film, Rørbæk attempts to 
determine a defined ‘Other”.  
In the film, the girl is seen fleeing floods, tornadoes, and other extreme events 
that will likely be exacerbated by climate change. Rørbæk posits that the ‘Other’ is 
represented by these extreme events and not by any human representative.96 The threat 
from these extreme events stems from the actual sources of global climatic change, 
which are not depicted in the film, which Rørbæk argues could mean that identities are 
not relevant to the film.97 In the end, Rørbæk attributes the lack of a definitive ‘Other’ 
in the film to the inherent ambiguity of images, leaving the role of ‘Other’ to be filled in 
by the audience.98 This article raises questions as to whether a truly universal ‘Self’ is 
possible.  
Visualization of Climate Change in the Media 
Much of the literature on this topic is focused on the representation of climate 
change in newspapers. O’Neill offers a particularly thorough analysis of the imagery 
associated with newspaper coverage of climate change in the US, UK, and Australia.99 
Within these data O’Neill found that the most common images associated with climate 
change, on average 48%, are pictures of people, and within that group most were 
                                                 
95 Ibid., 286.  
96 Ibid., 282.  
97 Ibid., 283.  
98 Ibid., 285.  
99 Saffron J. O’Neill, "Image matters: Climate change imagery in US, UK and Australian 
newspapers," Geoforum 49 (2013): 10-19. 
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images of political figures.100 The next most common grouping to be depicted was 
climate impacts, ranging from landscapes to animals to agriculture.101 Also common is 
climate protest, and much less common is climate causes and solutions.102 O’Neill 
argues that the dominant ways of visualizing climate change in the newspapers 
examined contribute to a feeling that climate change is both a contested issue, and 
“distant in both its causes and impacts.”103 Images of frustrated politicians and tension 
between political parties work to frame climate change as a contested space.104 Images 
that are devoid of humans and depict smokestacks, ice, or other generic representations 
create a frame of ‘distance’. These depictions deny agency to the audience by putting 
climate solutions out of reach. This distancing is perceived as a physical distance (e.g. 
melting ice in the arctic), and a mental distance (by placing the burden on industry to 
change itself).105 To apply the securitization framework, images of politicians do not 
contribute to a securitization. O’Neill’s analysis that depictions of politicians maintain 
the frame of ‘contestation’ would suggest that the images actively work against a 
securitization of climate change. Images of climate impacts could support a 
securitization argument, but the ‘distancing’ effect of generic nature images could 
reduce the salience of the threat.  
DiFrancesco and Young also determine common representations of climate 
change in newspapers, however their study is limited to Canadian newspapers.106 Their 
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101 Ibid., 14.  
102 Ibid., 14. 
103 Ibid., 14. 
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focus on Canada is justified by the “central role of wilderness, landscape, and climate in 
Canadian identity and sense of place.”107 They find that roughly half of the images 
connected to climate coverage contained depictions of nature, two thirds contained 
depictions of humans, and one third contained depictions of industry and technology.108 
Their primary results are not altogether different from O’Neill’s above, but their deeper 
analysis contains insights relevant to securitization:  
[A]rticles that appear with images are significantly more likely to include, 
among other things, attributions of blame for climate change, identification of a 
victim (human or non-human), use of a ‘crisis’ metaphor, mention of rights 
(human or non-human), and mention of the future. This combination of themes 
suggests that images tend to appear alongside articles that are moral or 
emotional in tone.109 
These findings read like a checklist of requirements for a securitization argument. 
Attributing blame roughly corresponds to establishing an ‘Other’, while identifying a 
victim corresponds to establishing the referent object. The reference to a crisis is 
common to securitization, as it makes normal political debate inadequate in addressing 
the issue. And lastly, the mentioning of the future speaks to securitization’s necessary 
allusion to possible threatening futures. This would suggest that within these data, 
securitizing arguments are more likely to use images than coverage that is not making a 
securitizing argument.  
 The role of the image in communicating climate change has also been applied to 
television coverage. León and Evriti conducted a content analysis of Spanish TV news 
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coverage of climate change over two short time periods.110 Their findings differ from 
those of studies of newspaper coverage of climate change, and they attribute this to the 
medium. The most common shots used to accompany stories on climate change are of 
melting Arctic ice, which the authors include in their consequences category.111 But 
shots of international climate negotiations, depicting people, are a close second.112 This 
preference for the spectacular images of destruction and beauty in the natural world is 
likely due to television’s gravitation towards “high impact rather than less tangible 
environmental processes.”113 León and Evriti also use this preference for events to 
explain the skew towards consequences, over causes and solutions, in TV coverage.114 
They also find that overall coverage of climate change on Spanish television decreased 
over the chosen time period, which could be explained by a lack of ‘fresh’ images to 
use on television.115  
Visualization of Climate Change by Activists 
 Moving outside of the media realm, Cozen brings our attention to how activists 
(in the limited, colloquial definition of the word) attempt to use images that play on a 
societal visual memory, in order to mobilize climate action.116 Green Patriot Posters is 
an initiative by the Canary Project that aims “to highlight the activism side of the 
acknowledged tension between dual impulses: artistic expression and activist goals.”117 
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This initiative invites artists to create artistic posters that seek to change perceptions of 
climate change and sustainability, and also invoke some form of public mobilization. 
The project very clearly and purposefully centers itself around US propaganda posters 
from World War Two, which is a deliberate choice to play upon a collective visual 
memory.118 This framing does a number of things for the project, Cozen argues. By 
evoking World War Two, a challenge that was overcome (by some at least), it 
reinforces the idea that climate change is assailable.119 By linking to a challenge that we 
have collectively overcome before, it could work to counteract problems of efficacy.  
Cozen also cites negatives of embracing the war mobilization framing. First, to 
construct a common enemy might lead to that enemy redoubling its efforts. What this 
means in the case of climate change, with the exact scope of the threat undefined, is not 
clear. The language used to create the war framing could be limiting in their appeal. 
Those that do not share the collective visual memory of US World War Two 
propaganda would likely be immune to the emotional weight of it. Also, Cozen argues 
that the binary focus of flipping existing practices of consumption limits the available 
options. 
 Further analysis of how activists visually frame climate change raises questions 
of how activists balance communicating the facts of climate change with 
communicating the emotions of climate change. Manzo raises questions of how to 
‘bring home’ the risks of climate change. Manzo first focuses on images of polar bears, 
the most circulated visual representations of climate change. Manzo argues that despite 
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the ubiquity of images of polar bears, they might be limited in their usefulness for 
communicating climate change.120 The limited usefulness is traced back to the 
emotional undertones of images of polar bears on melting ice. Firstly, the emotional 
weight might be lost on those without an affinity for wildlife.121 Therefore, its appeal 
may not be the universal image of climate change it is often thought to be. The second 
drawback is caused by the emotional appeal of these images. Manzo argues that images 
of polar bears, which are based on a ‘fear appeal’, work to create the same feeling of 
distance mentioned above.122 Manzo moves on to efforts by activist organizations in the 
UK to bring climate change into the everyday. Manzo cites literature that argues that 
using fear as a motivating force to change behavior is not effective, unless the fear can 
become personal.123  
Distant fears only work to frame climate change as an unstoppable process. 
Returning to the securitization framework, it appears that efficacy is not a factor for a 
successful securitization, but salience is. Therefore, for a securitization of climate 
change to achieve its desired goals it does not need to change the personal behavior of 
the audience, only to convince the audience of the immediacy of the threat. Her 
statement that “research demonstrates that iconic representations of climate change are 
often distancing…and paradoxical in the way they heighten people’s sense of the 
issue’s importance while simultaneously making them feel less able to do anything 
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about it” leaves open the possibility that iconic representations could support a 
successful securitization.  
 The second part of Manzo’s study considers the communicative power of global 
climate maps and their ability to communicate danger. Maps and atlases that illustrate 
global trends in temperature change, carbon emissions, or other measurable factors can 
communicate cause and effect in ways that highlight differences in the temporal and 
spatial consequences of climate change.124 While these methods might be desirable for 
communicating clearly the technical problem of climate change, they can also work 
against the creation of a universal referent object. Images of the earth from space have 
historically been extremely valuable in creating a common identity in that they show the 
Earth as an isolated object, with national borders and human constructions erased. 
Schneider attributes the galvanization of the environmental movement to mobilizing 
and unifying photographs of earth, specifically the ‘Earth Rise’ photograph taken during 
the Apollo 8 mission in 1968 and the ‘Blue Marble’ photograph taken during the Apollo 
17 mission in 1972.125 These images were so powerful at their time of creation that they 
were firmly solidified in the collective visual memory of not only Americans, but for 
people around the world.  
Schneider argues, paraphrasing Heidegger, that over time the intense immediate, 
emotional weight of these images and images like them became naturalized. And this 
naturalization leads to measurement of the Earth as an object of study, which in turn 
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leads to “the notion of a world that is imagined as manageable by humans.”126 
Schneider reiterates the point more bluntly by saying that the pure, vulnerable ‘Blue 
Marble’ seen by Apollo 17 is changed in our collective imagination when we apply the 
colors of scientific visualization. Thus, by trying to better communicate climate change, 
visualizations of scientific data possibly make solutions more difficult. Schneider 
argues that the application of the reds and oranges representing abnormally high 
temperatures in scientific data to a blue and vulnerable image of the earth shifts the 
thinking from unity to powerlessness.127 Once again, the literature points to 
visualizations of climate change stoking a feeling of distance and powerlessness.  
 There is a subsection of the literature on climate change communication that 
focuses on interviews and surveys to determine how climate change is visualized 
mentally. These articles might shed light on how individuals perceive and react to 
climate communication. Nicholson-Cole, through interviews with three 
demographically different groups in the UK, connects personal feelings of salience 
towards climate change to a certain kind of mental imagery.128 Unsurprisingly, mental 
images of climate change are in large-part dependent on images encountered in media, 
especially television.129 Participants in Nicholson-Cole’s study offered up their mental 
images, which reflected the images of melting ice, hurricanes, and struggling polar 
bears that are abundant in climate change communication. To increase the likelihood of 
engagement she offers suggestions for communication. The first is to make 
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visualizations relatable across both time and space. In other words, to localize the 
problem. This suggestion is aimed at overcoming the established distancing effect of 
much visualization. Next, is to base visualizations on the most accurate predictions 
possible. This is to maintain legitimacy with the audience. Next, to use visualizations 
that use affect to seize the attention of the audience. The usefulness of this is firmly 
established. Lastly, Nicholson-Cole suggests changing communications based on 
different target audiences separately from geographic targeting.130  
Much of the literature surveyed above does not give the audience of the images 
much consideration. Tailoring imagery to different audiences, and thus being able to 
fine-tune, would likely make securitization arguments more effective by being able to 
more precisely appeal to the collective visual memories of different groups. There is 
evidence that supports the idea that localized threats have an increased level of salience. 
O’Neill and Hulme found that participants in their study felt the most interest in, and 
most engagement with, visually presented climate risks when they were both localized 
and simplified. For example, participants felt more interested in images of climate 
threats to London, as compared to a visual representation of ocean acidification. 131 This 
study is limited in its scope, but coincides with many of the arguments already made. 
The idea of localization is not new in norms literature. Acharya’s definition of 
localization in relation to norms boils down to a foreign norm or idea being molded by 
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local norm entrepreneurs to fit better within existing norms.132 Norms can be adapted 
and shaped to be more compatible with local beliefs, norms, and practices.  
 To summarize, the literature on visually representing climate change has much 
to say about its effectiveness, its forms, and its implications. Several studies support the 
notion that much of the imagery used works to distance the audience from the threat. 
This distancing reduces the salience of the threat. Regardless of the intended referent 
object, images that distance the audience from the threat work against a successful 
securitization.  
Implications for the creation of a universal referent object appear throughout the 
literature. In determining a common referent object among visual securitization 
attempts, the ambiguity of images works against us. Images of melting Arctic ice, 
hurricane destruction, and dry river beds do not have a clear referent object. From the 
image alone, the only thing being clearly threatened is the environment through drastic 
changes. Images of polar bears, as common as they are, do explicitly show a referent 
object, the polar bear. But as has been shown above, the usefulness of polar bear images 
is limited due to the distancing effect they have. The images of humans, common in 
much of the newspaper coverage, possibly implies a universal human referent object. 
To determine this more precisely, a deeper analysis of the way images of humans and 
the corresponding text, or internal grammar, interact to frame the human as threatened. 
Also enlightening would be some insights into how audiences perceive images of 
humans in relation to climate change coverage in media. Images of humans do not 
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conclusively create a universal referent object, as the politicized coverage of climate 
change depicting humans in Australia shows.133  
There is not an image representative of climate change that has a universal 
applicability and can be effective over time. Just as any image is open to multiple 
interpretations, any visual representation of climate change will not lead to a single 
interpretation. Another complicating factor is that it is not clear whether a universal 
referent object is even achievable without a solidified, tangible, ‘Other’. In Schmittian 
logic, the ‘Self’ is constituted in relation to the ‘Other’. What is clear is that for any 
individual to feel personally threatened by climate change, the threats need to be applied 
locally. Whereas global images once worked to unify environmental efforts, the 
evidence now points to local images as a more powerful force in environmental 
discourses, even though environmental change has taken place on a global scale. The 
limited appeal of much of the imagery suggests that not only must visualizations be 
localized; they must also be tailored for different groups.  
The creation of an ‘Other’ in climate communications is difficult because the 
‘Other’ is humanity. However, there is a possibility that localization and tailoring of 
messages could create outgroups based on localized threats. If countries that would see 
considerable harm from climate change impacts better understand the threats they face, 
countries with high carbon emissions could become the ‘Other’. The opposite is just as 
likely; wealthy developed states could frame the poor and vulnerable victims of climate 
impacts as a threat to themselves. Many scholars have warned against creating climate 
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out-groups, and some have argued it is already happening.134 The creation of a climate 
‘Other’ could be destructive. Localizing the threats precisely enough could ‘bring 
home’ the dangers that the audience faces in such a way that it could become tangible in 
a way that would replace the need to put a face on the threat.  
 It is worth noting that of the cases surveyed here there is not an example of 
political elites using visual imagery to support a securitization. The only possible 
exception is the film shown at COP15, as it was created by a private production 
company “at the request of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”135 This fact is due 
to the lower legitimacy of media and activist actors in comparison to political elites; the 
reliance on the affective value of images is used to fill the gap. It is not unheard of for 
political elites to resort to visual securitizations, Colin Powell’s highly visual 
presentation at the UN serving as the best example.136 
 The last conclusion that we can make from the literature on visual 
representations of climate change is that there is some evidence that language that uses 
many of the tactics of securitization is more often accompanied by images. DiFrancesco 
and Young’s study was only of Canadian newspapers, so the applicability is limited.137 
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This evidence supports the notion that visual securitizations are used more often by 
actors outside of the political elite.  
 The final chapter will seek to answer the question of whether climate change has 
been successfully securitized, and what determines a successful securitization. The 
questions of whether climate change should, or should not be, securitized will also be 
addressed. And finally, some strategic guidance to more effectively securitize climate 
change will be offered.  
Chapter 3: Securitizing Anthropogenic Climate Change 
 There have been numerous instances of climate change and security coexisting 
within discourses, dating farther back than many would expect.138 For many this has 
been done to take advantage of the attention and action that the word security demands. 
The goals of these actors are varied: some want to see their country remain secure in a 
rapidly changing global environment, others wish to protect the vulnerable from the 
worst effects of change, and still others want rapid and widespread change within 
human systems, because they see the future of humanity in jeopardy. Some of these 
actors have seen more success than others.  
This chapter aims to answer three questions revolving around securitization, and 
the securitization of climate change in particular. First, what makes a securitization 
successful is not clearly defined within the literature. Without addressing and having a 
framework for explaining how the transition from securitizing move to complete 
securitization happens, the process cannot be explained adequately. Second, I will 
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determine whether climate securitizations have been successful. Complicating this 
answer is the existence of several climate security discourses that can, and have been, 
securitized apart from one another. Third is the question of whether a securitization can 
be ‘just’. This is one of many questions where recent securitization scholars have come 
to disagree with the original Copenhagen School scholars. Lastly, I attempt to offer 
some guidance for a strategic guidance on climate change communication. 
Securitizations may be successful in creating legitimacy for policy measures 
designed to confront the characterized threat, but policy implementation can be 
unsuccessful due to competing securitizations. What makes one policy win-out over 
another is the salience of the threat defined in the securitization. I argue that this 
concept of competing securitizations explains why in some cases policy measures have 
not been taken on climate change, because other securitizations are more salient. On the 
question of whether a securitization can be ‘just’, or morally right, I argue that the 
intersubjective process of securitization is not inherently undemocratic. Because 
securitization is discursive and requires the audience to consent, the process can be 
democratic and open. This openness is also reliant on non-exceptional measures that 
already exist within a democratic system. Finally, drawing on the visual communication 
literature of chapter 2, I argue that climate threats need to be localized with targeted 
visual representations of threat to sufficiently communicate the consequences climate 
change.  
This chapter begins with discussing the empirical evidence of links between 
climate change and security in an effort to understand how scientific evidence may 
contribute to establishing a societal context for how climate change and security are 
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perceived.  Next, I determine what makes a securitization successful and determine 
whether climate securitizations have been successful within different discourses. I then 
go on to outline what makes a securitization ‘just’ and end by offering some guidance 
on better communicating climate threats.  
Societal Context – Empirical Evidence for Climate Security 
Before turning to the question of whether anthropogenic climate change has 
been successfully securitized, a consideration of the empirical evidence for climate 
security risks is warranted. As has been established in the previous chapter, the societal 
context is an important factor in facilitating a securitization. Considerable empirical 
evidence is not enough to establish climate change as a security threat within 
securitization because the issue needs to be framed in the language of security. There is 
empirical evidence that issues like obesity and drunk driving pose a threat to humans, 
but they have not become securitized. For this to happen, a securitizing actor would 
have to communicate these issues as security threats that need an urgent policy 
response. However, empirical evidence can facilitate the construction of a securitizing 
move by contributing to a larger societal context. Generally, the empirical evidence on 
the links between environmental change and armed conflict is much less established 
than many in policy circles make it out to be.139 These questions were originally given 
considerable attention in the late 1980s, a development that Simon Dalby claims was 
caused by the Chernobyl disaster and the exceptionally warm summer of 1988.140 The 
issue has evolved and grown since then. There are several categories of research 
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questions and different conceptions of security at play in this diverse research. To 
paraphrase Salehyan, most scholars agree that climate and conflict interact, but the 
details of that relationship are not well understood.141    
There is a considerable amount of research on the links between climatic change 
and communal, intrastate, and interstate conflict. Altogether, the literature is 
inconclusive. In a survey of studies on climatic change and intrastate violence, Thiesen, 
Gleditsch, and Buhaug, find no conclusive relationship between the two. Studies of 
interstate conflict and water scarcity does not find an increase in conflict, and in some 
cases finds an increase in cooperation.142 Salehyan has criticized much of the research 
on climate change and conflict for attempting to oversimplify complex relationships and 
ignoring the factors of human agency and government management.143 At most, it has 
been established that there is some relationship between climate factors and conflict, but 
the exact nature of the relationship is far from understood. There are some that have 
made the connection between current conflicts and environmental change factors, but 
these studies are not without their criticisms. The Syrian civil war is among the most 
prominent.144 To sum up the empirical evidence, the interplay between climatic factors 
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and conflict is situationally dependent, has limited explanatory value, and is 
inconsistent.  
Substantial empirical evidence can aid a securitization, but it is not a 
requirement. Security issues can exist independently of the objective threatening nature 
of the issue. Deadly issues like obesity and drunk driving are not security issues because 
they have not been securitized. The opposite is just as likely. Terrorism has been 
securitized in the United States to an extent that is disconnected from its objective 
threat.145 Even if empirical evidence for a link between climate change and security was 
completely non-existent, climate change could still be securitized. Empirical evidence 
works as a facilitating condition for the success of a securitization by supporting a 
predisposition to the securitization.  
Successful Securitizations 
Within the Copenhagen School’s framework for a successful securitization, the 
proposed emergency measures do not have to be implemented, the threat must only be 
accepted by the audience, and the actor freed from constraining rules.146 In the words of 
Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, a securitization is successful when it has gained enough 
credibility to “legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been 
possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of return, and 
necessity.”147 In essence, a securitization is successful when the stigma of taking 
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extraordinary measures has disappeared, not necessarily when the measures are taken. 
The Copenhagen School puts the power of determining a securitization’s success in the 
hands of the audience.148 The securitization argument has to convince the audience to an 
extent to “gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from it is possible to 
legitimize emergency measures.”149 Legitimacy is measured differently depending on 
the targeted audience. Legitimacy within the general public could be measured with 
survey data. The data in chapter 1 are an example of measuring legitimacy in elite 
discourses in that the consistent presence of a framing in a discourse represents an 
acceptance of that framing. An acceptance of that framing by those participating within 
it acts of evidence of legitimacy for that framing.    
The considerable securitization literature that has evolved since the Copenhagen 
School first introduced the theory has critiqued and complicated the ways of 
determining a securitization’s success. Floyd directly challenges the Copenhagen 
School’s methods of determining a successful securitization on several points.150 Floyd 
argues that it is up to the practitioners of security to determine success. This 
requirement would overcome what Floyd calls the ‘constructivist deficit’, because 
securitization cannot be truly constructivist if the actors themselves are not determining 
securitizations.151 In Floyd’s framework for successful securitizations, a change in 
behavior by the securitizing actor is required.152 This framework is useful, but is overly 
constraining in some ways. Floyd’s requirement that actors “act or change their 
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behaviour in response to the securitizing speech act they themselves uttered” severely 
limits the pool of eligible securitizing actors, perhaps unintentionally. If the securitizing 
actor and the actor implementing the policy must be the same, then scientists, activists, 
and other non-governmental actors are limited in the issues they can successfully 
securitize. There are certainly securitizing moves, even made by government officials, 
that pursue a policy change from another actor. This portion of Floyd’s framework is 
overly constricting on the securitization process. 
There are portions of Floyd’s framework that are more useful. She states that 
while a policy change must happen for a securitization to be successful, it does not 
necessarily have to have the extraordinary quality required by the Copenhagen 
School.153 This relaxation, or perhaps confusion, of the extraordinary measures 
requirement is seen in more recent works on securitization. This confusion has 
complicated the study of securitization itself, as some scholars have come to ignore 
completely the extraordinary measures aspect and focused solely on the language used 
by actors.154 But the reliance on a call for extraordinary measures has been 
underdeveloped and does not reflect the reality of security practice. Exceptionality is 
not a requirement because there are numerous security threats that can be addressed 
without the addition of new powers.155 To illustrate, in a securitization with State A as 
the referent object, and State B as the threat, extraordinary or emergency powers are not 
a necessity if there is an existing security structure in State A. If the president of State 
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A, citing an existential threat, calls for war against State B, and the legislative body of 
State A consents, then there are no new powers created. There is nothing exceptional 
about a democratic body acting within its powers to make a formal declaration of war. 
The loosening of the extraordinary measures requirement within securitization may 
make the theory less concrete, but it also better reflects security practice. Salter argues 
that it is the creation of new executive powers that constitute a successful securitization, 
which he sees as non-exceptional.156 The creation of new powers does not deny a 
securitization, but it is also not a requirement. Salter’s executive power requirement 
only holds up if a declaration of war, or an authorization of military action is seen as a 
new power, and not one that previously existed through constitutionally created powers 
and a legislative process. I disagree with these authors that a successful securitization 
requires a change in policy. The basis of securitization is how the perception of an issue 
changes when security logic is applied. The theory has nothing to do with action. The 
success or failure of a policy implementation can be evidence of powerful competing 
securitizations, but does mean a securitization has failed.  
McDonald’s analysis of the failed implementation of climate change policy in 
Australia is an enlightening account of a securitization move without exceptional policy 
proposals. Between 2007 and 2009 Prime Minister Rudd invoked the language of 
climate security, and called for a national climate plan. McDonald uses survey data to 
show that these climate security arguments had broad public support but despite this, 
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the national climate plan was never enacted.157 The details of the national climate plan 
were not out of the ordinary in comparison to climate plans of other countries. 
McDonald’s explanation for this failure is useful for examining the securitization of 
climate change on a larger scale. Mcdonald’s explanation is that securitization happens 
in two separate stages, what Roe calls the ‘stage of identification’ wherein the threat is 
identified and recognized, and the ‘stage of mobilization’ wherein the suggested policy 
to respond to the threat is accepted.158 A securitization may successfully reach the first 
stage, but fail to have its suggested policy implemented. McDonald’s explanation, while 
interesting, does not accurately represent the framework of securitization. Any number 
of factors can make a policy implementation following a securitization unsuccessful, 
but this does not make the securitization itself unsuccessful. This is explained by the 
fact that securitizations do not exist in a vacuum, and must compete with other 
securitizing moves. McDonald’s explanation for the failure of the mobilization stage of 
climate securitization in Australia is that the economic security argument had a directly 
contradictory policy suggestion, and Australians were more convinced, or more afraid 
of, the economic securitization argument.159  
This explanation makes sense within the original framework of securitization 
without the need for the two-stage process. The climate securitization and the economic 
securitizations can exist simultaneously, but if the proposed policies directly contradict 
then the more salient threat will be responded to. Different referent objects affect how 
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the audience responds to a securitization. If the economic securitization was made in a 
way that made it more salient for the general public, then it is not surprising that the 
economic policy was implemented.  
Keeping the focus of securitization on discourse and not policy outcomes 
simplifies and analysis and prevents the explanatory power of the theory from being 
overstated. Chapter 2 established that images can be effective in securitizing, but also 
that images cannot advocate a single policy response. The policy response to the 
securitization, if one happens at all, is separate from the establishment of the 
securitization. 
In sum, securitizations are successful when an audience accepts the securitizing 
move, which can be measured through discourse analysis, survey data, elections, and 
ways of estimating social acceptance. A securitization is still successful if the 
proceeding policy is not successfully implemented because securitizations can have 
competing policy implications. a securitization can be deemed successful in identifying 
a threat separate from acting on the threat.  
Securitizing Anthropogenic Climate Change 
 Some have argued that climate change securitizations exist on several separate 
levels, separated largely by different referent objects. These multiple discourses are 
categorized as humans, states, the international system, and the ecosystem.160 To use the 
language of security, these discourses revolve around human security, state security, 
international security, and ecological security. Acknowledging these different 
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discourses is important, as McDonald argues, because they have quite different policy 
implications for a response to climate change and can shed light on the more general 
issue of climate change politics. Effectively, these discourses can be securitized 
separately and either reinforce one another or marginalize one another.161 In the same 
way that economic security arguments pushed out climate security arguments in 
Australia, different climate security arguments may work against one another. Taking 
McDonald’s notion of competing climate-security discourses into consideration, then it 
is impossible to treat climate-security as a single securitization; it must be 
disaggregated. Because of the separation of securitization into two stages, this analysis 
will only seek to determine if the first stage has been successful. The success of the 
second stage requires more in-depth analysis that a case study of a specific securitizing 
move would better capture.  
 Schäfer et al. conducted a content analysis similar to the data presented in 
chapter 1 that tracks securitizing language connected to climate change in newspapers 
from a wide variety of countries.162 Their study specifically focuses on the national 
security and human security discourses. Their study finds that from the period of 1996 
to 2010, the use of securitizing language in climate change coverage increased 600% 
overall.163 Worth noting is that this study found a considerable regional disparity, with 
western countries having higher levels of securitizing language. The prevalence of 
securitizing language within media coverage is not enough to definitively say whether 
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or not climate change has been securitized in the national and human security 
discourses, but it offers some evidence that this might be the case.  
 Within the international security discourse there is a harder case to be made that 
climate change has become securitized. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 
arguably the actor with the most legitimacy within international security discourses, has 
not directly addressed climate change. The UNSC has repeatedly called for more study 
of possible links, and has said that the links may exist. This lack of a full-throated 
declaration by the UNSC is somewhat curious in light of the UNSC’s comments on the 
Ebola crisis in Africa, which they directly called a threat to international peace and 
security.164 The Ebola crisis was similar to climate change in that it was a non-
traditional security threat that many speculated could have larger traditional security 
implications.165 There are other actors with high levels of legitimacy that have used 
relatively explicit security language to discuss climate change. After the United Nations 
General Assembly requested a report into the linkages between climate change and 
conflict, the office of the Secretary General issued its report Climate change and its 
possible security implications in 2009.166 This report, using the ‘might’ and ‘may’ 
wording that is common in the empirical literature, discusses climate change in terms of 
a threat to human security, national security, and international security mostly through 
the mechanisms of resource scarcity, political destabilization, and migration conflicts. 
In the sense that securitizations represent predictions of a possible future, this report 
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qualifies as a securitizing move on the part of the Secretary General. The report even 
prescribes a policy response that boils down to accelerated mitigation efforts coupled 
with financing adaptation.167 
 Think tanks have been considerably active in climate security discourses. An 
analysis and categorization of some of the most prominent climate security think tank 
reports found that the most common discourse among them was that of human 
security.168  One report was most concerned with national security, and another was 
focused on what the authors call ‘global security’.169 The concept of ‘global security’ is 
not well defined in the study, but it seems to be somewhat analogous to international 
security while some of the language is reminiscent of the ecological security 
discourse.170 This study does have limitations, because the four reports analyzed cannot 
give us a general sense of how climate change is characterized by think tanks, only how 
security oriented think tanks discuss climate change as a security issue. Gleditsch and 
Nordås offer an analysis of IPCC reports’ discussion of climate conflict links and find 
contradictory messaging.171 The conflicting messages likely reflect the contradictory 
nature of the empirical literature that the IPCC bases its reports on.  
 Survey data give the most support in assessing whether climate change has been 
securitized within the general public, but makes it difficult to aggregate into separate 
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discourses. A Pew research survey asked people around the world if “global climate 
change is harming/will harm people around the world.”172 In that survey, the global 
median that agreed with that statement was 51%, meaning a majority of people 
surveyed recognized climate change as harmful. Combining survey data and discourse 
analysis leads to the conclusion that the first stage of securitization has been successful 
within the human security discourse, the national security discourse, and possibly the 
international security discourse. Another survey allows for a deeper dive into the 
perception of climate threats within the United States. The Climate Change in the 
American Mind report offers evidence that a securitization with the ecological security 
discourse has been successful. In this report, a majority of respondents thought that 
climate change will cause a great deal of harm to future generations of humans, as well 
as plant and animal species. The success of a securitization of the climate change-
human security discourse is also evident with 65% of respondents saying that climate 
change will cause a great deal, or a moderate amount of harm to people living in 
developing countries and the world’s poor.173 These data suggest that, within the United 
States, the first stage of human, national, and ecological security securitizations has 
been successful.  
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‘Just’ Securitizations 
 The Copenhagen School is clear in its conviction that securitizations are a 
negative development, and desecuritizations are desirable. Buzan, Waever, and de 
Wilde consider securitizations a failure to deal with issues through normal everyday 
political avenues.174 The ideal situation would be to deal with an issue through normal 
democratic political debate. Some scholars have engaged with the possibility of a 
securitization that is not inherently ‘bad’. Roe argues that the intersubjective nature of 
securitization maintains the openness of normal politics.175 Some Copenhagen School 
scholars have even connected securitization to Schmitt’s politics of exclusion.176 The 
main assertion of these scholars is that securitization and security dialogues are 
inherently exclusionary and undemocratic. But security must exist within a democratic 
society, and cannot exist without security discourses. 
Because securitization requires the consent of the audience, it can be understood 
as an agreement between securitizing actor and audience. The notion of consent is the 
basis of democratic governance. Some securitizations may appear to adhere to 
democratic norms and openness from a distance, but are carried out undemocratically. 
The Turkish referendum of April 2017 happened within democratic institutions, but the 
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vote happened under a state of emergency and there is substantial evidence of vote 
rigging.177  
There are several critiques of securitization that hinge on the idea of 
securitization ending normal democratic processes.178 Aradau focuses on the 
undemocratic nature of exceptional measures, arguing that the “speed required by the 
exceptional suspends the possibilities of judicial review or other modalities of public 
influence upon bureaucratic or executive decisions.”179 In other words, the urgency with 
which exceptional measures are called for in securitizing moves denies the possibility of 
normal debate and review.  
The possibility of an ‘open’ or democratic securitization is improved by two 
aspects defined earlier. The separation of securitization from policy implementation 
means that the policy can still be defeated. The securitization creates the legitimacy for 
the policy, but does not put the policy into place. This is illustrated usefully in 
McDonald’s account of climate securitization in Australia, wherein the audience 
consented to the initial framing, but not to the proposed policy. This makes it possible 
for the securitizing actor to receive feedback on the policy, tweak it, and once again 
seek consent from the audience. Aradau emphasizes that a securitization precludes 
sufficient time for a securitizing move to be contested. But this assertion does not 
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reflect how securitizing moves are depicted in the literature. Returning to McDonald, 
the securitization of climate change in Australia was directly contested by political 
actors, which led to the failure of the policy implementation.180 The legitimation of the 
policy does not take the policy out of the democratic process.   
The possibility of non-exceptional measures also helps to maintain the 
‘openness’ of a securitization, in that the policy outcome may fall entirely within 
existing security frameworks. The proposed climate action plan in Australia was 
entirely unremarkable, it consisted of efforts toward mitigation, adaptation, and 
international climate diplomacy.181 This plan was to be implemented through a regular 
parliamentary process, which ultimately failed. Aradau’s focus on the exceptionality of 
securitizations and their undemocratic nature can only be applied to those 
securitizations that do call for such measures. However, exceptional measures are still a 
possibility, and the undemocratic features of emergency powers are not completely 
prevented.  
Floyd has pushed back on this by creating a framework for a ‘just’ 
securitization, similar to the just war tradition. This framework contradicts core 
elements of securitization theory, and has requirements that are difficult to achieve. 
Floyd’s framework has three criteria: 
(1) there must be an objective existential threat, which is to say a threat that 
endangers the survival of [a] an actor or an order regardless of whether anyone 
has realized this; 
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(2) the referent object of security must be morally legitimate, which is the case 
only when the referent object is conducive to human well-being defined as the 
satisfaction of human needs; and. 
(3) the security response must be appropriate to the threat in question, which is 
to say that (a) the security response must be measured in accordance with the 
capabilities of the aggressor and (b) the securitizing actor must be sincere in his 
or her intentions.182 
 
From the start, Floyd’s framework is incompatible with a traditional Copenhagen 
School view of securitization. For a ‘just’ securitization to require the existential threat 
to be objective, (i.e. measurable) contradicts the basis of securitization, which is that all 
threats are socially constructed. Buzan et al. entertain the idea that some threats could 
be objective, such as “tanks crossing the border,” but they also maintain that the 
perceived hostility of the invaders is socially constructed.183 Those tanks could be part 
of a peacekeeping force or participating in military drills. Buzan et al. go on to question 
whether an objective measure of security is even possible, as no theory has yet provided 
one. The incompatibility of this first requirement is acknowledged by Floyd.184 The 
problem with Floyd’s first criteria is not that it deviates from the original securitization 
theory, but rather that she offers no actionable way of determining an objective threat. 
She suggests that to determine an objective existential threat, we must look to the 
intention and the means of the threatening actor.185 Both criteria are oftentimes 
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unknowable. Applying these criteria to anthropogenic climate change sheds light on 
their clumsiness. Determining a threatening ‘actor’ within climate change is just as 
difficult as determining one in other non-traditional security threats. If a securitizing 
actor were to invoke rising sea levels as a threatening actor, then we must next 
determine its intention. There is no way to determine the intention of global 
environmental degradation, rising sea levels, the Ebola virus, and a host of other non-
anthropomorphic threats. Floyd makes no effort to apply this objectification to non-
traditional threats. The capability criteria is more applicable to some non-traditional 
threats, such as disease, but is still lacking. Determining the capability of climate 
change to threaten or inflict damage on any referent object is a difficult to determine 
and somewhat unpredictable due to the complexity of the global climate. There is no 
reliable way to determine the capabilities of a threatening ‘actor’ that is defined by 
uncertainty and unpredictability. Floyd goes on to say that an objective existential threat 
cannot exist without intentionality.186 This means that many non-traditional security 
threats are completely excluded from her framework. An objective measure of the 
security threat is not attainable, and as such does not offer an insight in determining a 
‘just securitization’.  
 Floyd’s second criteria, that of the appropriateness of the referent object, is also 
challenging. In her framework, the legitimacy of a referent object is based entirely on 
the conduciveness of the object to human well-being. She maintains that the principles 
that contribute to human well-being (autonomy and civil liberties) exist most commonly 
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in liberal democracies that uphold human rights.187 This criteria is limiting in that it 
restricts ‘just’ securitizations to those within human security, national security, and 
international security discourses. The ecological security discourse, which holds the 
entire biosphere as its referent object, could never be ‘just’ unless the benefit to humans 
is clear. Ecological security seeks to reevaluate the relationship between humans and 
our natural surroundings.188 Many of the societal benefits of globalization that increase 
autonomy would likely be seen as threats to ecological security. The concept of ‘human 
well-being’ may be underdefined here, but this criteria is more useful than the first. 
Restricting legitimacy to those referent objects that support democratic principles may 
balance out a possibly undemocratic securitizing move. A securitizing move that 
sacrifices democratic processes in the short term would be seen as legitimate only if it 
defends threatened democratic principles in the long-term.  
Floyd’s last criteria requires proportionality and sincerity. The proportionality 
condition is clear, but determining what is proportional is difficult if an actor cannot 
faithfully ascertain the capabilities of the threatening ‘actor’. Models and estimates can 
give us some insight, but the prospect of climate tipping points that rapidly change the 
global environment create more uncertainty than models of more traditional 
securitizations. Sincerity is based on a matching up of word and action on the part of the 
securitizing actor. The securitizing move is conceived to benefit the referent object. If 
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the implemented policy neglects the stated referent object, but benefits the actor, it is 
insincere and therefore illegitimate.  
Considering the literature on ‘just’ securitizations, it seems to be that a workable 
framework does not exist. But some of the aspects established above might lay the 
groundwork for one. Most importantly, thinking of securitization process as a two-stage 
process maintains a level of ‘openness’ and this ‘openness’ is maintained when the 
prescribed policy is non-exceptional. A securitization must work within existing legal 
and democratic structure to be ‘just’. Other than that, I argue, the intersubjective aspect 
and the necessity of consent within a securitization is sufficient for them to be ‘just’.   
Communicating Climate Threats 
 As discussed in chapter 2, a large portion of representations of climate change, 
especially visual representations, work to distance the viewer from the threat. These 
images of polar bears and melting glaciers do not decrease the recognition of the threat, 
but rather reduce the salience. Salience is important for many of the policy responses to 
climate change, because in some discourses the prescribed policies require individual 
behavioral change on a societal level. Societal behavioral change could in turn lead to 
greater support for similar behavioral changes within the international community; 
Finnemore and Sikkink note that this is a common pathway for norms.189 The concept 
of strategic social construction is a process whereby norm entrepreneurs promote norms 
in order to change the behavior of others.190 Two separate logics are at work in strategic 
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social construction: the logic of consequences, and the logic of appropriateness. These 
logics, and how they might be utilized to communicate the threats of climate change, 
will be briefly explored.  
Drawing on the strengths and weaknesses of climate communication detailed in 
chapter 2, the logic of consequences can be used to increase the salience for an 
audience. As the literature in chapter 2 suggests, localizing the threats of climate change 
increases the salience of the issue.191 The logic of consequences is driven by self-
interest. An actor complies with a norm because doing otherwise would lead to an 
undesirable consequence. To localize the effects, and to play off of the logic of 
consequences, actors may want to turn to images similar to figure 1.192 This image 
could overcome the kind of objectification that many global temperature and 
precipitation models fall into precisely because it is extremely localized.193 Instead of 
creating the feeling of powerlessness created by other ‘objective measures’ of the earth, 
this image could create salience. By bringing down the scientific models from the god-
like perspective to a more relatable one, these images allow the audience to better 
imagine how impacts of environmental change could personally impact them.  
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Figure 1: A FEMA map depicting areas of possible flooding in Norman, Oklahoma 
 
The logic of consequences is in play here because the threat depicted in figure 1 is 
aimed at the personal safety and economic security of the viewer (assuming the viewer 
is seeing his/her own personalized version of this image). The localized view is a 
benefit, but also a drawback. A neighborhood view such as this has the powerful 
localizing effect for, at most, a few hundred people; certainly not a generalizable image. 
Data tools used by marketers to geographically target groups of people are more 
promising in being able to microtarget salient messages to an audience. Applying the 
same flood hazard metric to a landmark, such as a city center, could possibly increase 
the number of people that have an emotional reaction, but is not clear if the reaction 
would be as powerful.  
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 Another possible avenue of localizing climate threats is that of virtual reality. 
Allowing the viewer/wearer to be immersed within a constructed possible future that is 
affected by climate change, and allowing him/her to interact with that world, could 
possibly overcome much of the problems of climate communication. This concept is 
already being applied to ocean acidification, one of the most distant and hard-to-grasp 
impacts of climate change.194 Using virtual reality to localize climate change effects 
might be as simple as overlaying sea level rise projections onto Google street view and 
allowing someone to traverse their own city, or the world’s landmarks. Virtual reality 
likely offers a more emotionally powerful experience for the audience, but is much 
more difficult to scale-up when compared to microtargeting.  
To argue for a change in societal and international behavior because climate 
change threatens the existence of humanity, is to argue that change is appropriate. The 
concept of norms is based on the idea that identities influence our behavior. This all-
encompassing norm is aided by its universalism, which some have argued is an attribute 
of successful norms.195 The universality of the norm allows it to transcend specific 
cultures, but it also may inhibit internalization of the norm. To use the logic of 
appropriateness in climate communication, actors should play on factors of 
responsibility. The responsibility of humans to humans is where the norm of treating 
climate change as a threat to humanity should have the most traction. But that 
universality has not manifested itself internationally or domestically in many countries.  
                                                 
194 Randy Rieland, "How Virtual Reality Can Help Us Feel the Pain of Climate Change." Smithsonian 
Magazine. October 26, 2016. Accessed April 2017. http://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/how-
virtual-reality-can-help-us-feel-pain-climate-change-180960918/. 
195 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. "International norm dynamics and political 
change." International organization 52.4 (1998): 907.  
81 
 
The logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness exist within the 
different climate security discourses, but are not equally prevalent within each. These 
two logics can and do exist simultaneously. An actor can recognize and act upon the 
consequences of climate change for himself/herself while also acknowledging that 
action is also appropriate outside of self-interest. This is apparent in human security and 
international security discourses that revolve around the vulnerability of certain 
populations and countries to shocks and instability. The promotion of human well-being 
and the stability of the international community is the appropriate action, but within 
these same discourses there are references to the potential for failure to create breeding 
grounds for resource starved and frustrated people. Separating these two logics within 
climate security discourses is difficult precisely because actors operate with motives.  
Conclusion 
In light of the difficulty of localizing the threats of climate change, turning to 
technology may be the answer. The use of data and microtargeting strategies for climate 
communication makes it possible to localize climate threats. Social marketing, or 
applying marketing methodology to influence public opinion to benefit the intended 
target and society as a whole, offers a clear, actionable strategy to drive behavioral 
change or support. Using this type of data, social marketers can tailor messages based 
on any number of segmented demographic categories. These strategies most often target 
based on behavior and attitudes. There is some evidence that this is an effective 
strategy.196  
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But climate change and its dangers have a decidedly geographic dependence that 
makes targeting based on geography, in combination with other demographic factors, 
important. Using climate forecasting, detailed messaging could be used on a city-wide 
basis, but could also be reduced to a zip code, or possibly even a neighborhood. This 
kind of segmentation is much less complex when compared to what political campaigns 
have been doing for years.197  
This strategy would be effective in counteracting competing securitizations. If 
climate change communications can be highly localized, they can push back on those 
competing securitizations that may already carry more weight due to their salience. To 
apply this to a real-world example, if climate change threats had been tailored and 
localized in Australia, the competing economic securitization may not have been as 
strong. This is true because, once localized, the threats of climate change become linked 
to other sectors. If one fully understands the impacts of climate change in their day-to-
day life, then they understand the economic, health, and social implications.  
McDonald puts part of the blame for the failed securitization of climate change 
in Australia in the hands of a competing securitization that holds as its referent object 
the security of the Australian economy. A shrinkage of carbon emitting industries 
would hurt the economy. But if someone can see that Sydney may be flooded or it may 
be too hot to farm, then climate security can be linked to economic security. Not only 
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can localized targeting increase the salience, it can also increase the connection to other 
areas that climate change may  affect. 
This accomplishes what political actors are attempting in trying to securitize 
multiple sectors. The argument that climate change will adversely affect health, the 
economy, and the environment is made more convincing when those things can be 
shown through targeted communications. Targeted communications could be as precise 
as estimating increases in insurance premiums, or whether temperature changes make it 
possible for a certain type of insect or algae to now live in the targeted area. In trying to 
communicate to the broader public, much of the language and images associated with 
climate change work against the thing they are trying to accomplish, but images like 
figure 1 that can visualize climate change effects at a neighborhood level and take 
advantage of the immediacy of images. Seeing an image of your own neighborhood 
overlaid with graphics depicting likely flood levels, or sea level rise, would make these 
issues personal. Seeing the places you are most familiar with violated by flood waters 
would make the threat real. There may be other ways of articulating the threats of 
climate change on a more personal level. For example, Vice President Al Gore has 
replaced images of starving polar bears with images of mosquitoes at climate 
lectures.198  
 For the most part climate change discourses have been successfully securitized, 
but the prospect of enforceable international agreements has decreased in recent years. 
The number of people that see climate change as a very serious problem ranges from 
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41-55% in the countries included in chapter 1, excluding New Zealand.199 To change 
these numbers and create concerted national and international efforts to take action, 
actors need to operate on the understanding that truly, ‘all politics is local’.  
 There are several ways to expand this research that would be useful in the 
future. Expanding securitization research outside of western democracies will help to 
broaden the theory. Including data from newspapers from every country that has party 
platforms would make the analysis more complete. Collecting and analyzing similar 
newspaper and political party data from non-western countries would shed light on how 
climate change is discussed in countries where the immediate effects will likely be 
much stronger. South Africa and India would be valuable starting places for expanding 
the research. Expanding the timeframe of the data would also be useful in tracking 
climate discourse since it first became a topic in public discourses in the late 1980s. 
Being able to examine how the discourses have changed over time would highlight how 
events shape how we think about an issue.  
 Executing a project of this size was a challenge in itself. Limiting the data 
collected to a size that was both manageable and at the same time representative was 
difficult. Using three newspapers based in the United States limits the applicability of 
the analysis to countries other than the US.  
 Anthropogenic climate change is an issue with effects that span the globe; 
effects that touch every country and every sector of life. But in communicating those 
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effects, the urgency is lost in abstractness. Actors have tried to frame climate change 
differently over the years, and personal behavior and international cooperation has 
ebbed and flowed.  
Even if someone perfectly understands the mechanics of ocean acidification, it is 
no guarantee that they understand the implications. For people to understand the 
implications of climate change, the issue needs to be made personal. If real change is to 
happen, the dangers need to be disaggregated. Communities and individuals need to 
know what their worlds will look like with inaction. In other words, the biggest problem 
with communicating the dangers of climate change is not that there is no ‘other’ to point 
to, but the fact that the audience is too far removed from the referent object.  
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